A Sceptical Paradox for Computational Artefacts

Abstract

By analogy with Kripke’s claim that no fact of the matter can determine the meaning of a word, the sceptical paradox of implementation is an argument to the conclusion that no fact of the matter can determine the function of a computational artefact. The paradox targets the prevailing view within the philosophy of computer science, according to which the function of a computational artefact is to be identified with the content of its functional specification, a mathematical object that formalises the intentions of the artefact’s designer. In existing formulations, such a view requires the existence of certain semantic intentions in the head of the designer. However, if we accept Kripke’s claim that there is no such thing as a mental state of semantic intention, this leaves ultimately indeterminate what is the function implemented by a computational artefact. Just as Kripke’s solution to the paradox requires replacing the received conception of language with a very different one, so the sceptical paradox for computational artefacts forces us to explore a new perspective on computational artefacts that, this time, does without semantic intentions.