Philosophical Inquiries

Guido Cusinato, Periagoge. Theory of Singularity and Philosophy as an Exercise of Transformation

2024-09-02T14:39:58+00:00

Review of Guido Cusinato, Periagoge. Theory of Singularity and Philosophy as an Exercise of Transformation

Expanding epistemic public trust

2024-09-02T14:36:42+00:00

This paper examines how communication between experts and lay citizens influences the development of criteria for epistemic public trust, building upon the detailed framework proposed by Irzik and Kurtulmus (2019). We first analyse the epistemic significance of trust and its implications in the public sphere. Our focus is twofold: identifying what attributes make experts trustworthy and exploring the reasons and second-order evidence that lay people can utilize to justify their trust in experts. We argue that the way experts engage in argumentation plays a crucial role: it is essential for their epistemic responsibility towards lay citizens and serves as a key indicator of their trustworthiness. Based on these considerations, we suggest an additional criterion for experts – facilitating rather than hindering the public discussion. Using an example from expert and layperson discussions during the COVID-19 pandemic, we demonstrate how this criterion can be practically applied.

Feyerabendian pluralism in practice: lessons from the Di Bella case

2024-09-02T14:33:17+00:00

This paper contrasts two ingredients of Feyerabendian pluralism: the idea that the proliferation of theories and methods is good for science (the “limited pluralism” view) and the view of knowledge as an ever increasing ocean of mutually incompatible alternatives (the “oceanic” view). We argue that, in order for Feyerabendian pluralism to be tenable, the limited pluralism view should be decoupled from the oceanic one, and the latter rejected. We use as a case study that of Luigi Di Bella, an obscure Italian physician who in 1997-1998 suddenly became a national celebrity as the self-proclaimed discoverer of “the cure for cancer”. When the case erupted, no evidence of the efficacy of Di Bella’s unconventional approach to cancer treatment was available, and the relevant experts concurred that the so-called “Di Bella method” (DBM) did not show any promise. Yet, the Parliament passed a piece of ad hoc legislation authorizing a series of phase II state-funded clinical trials aimed at assessing the DBM. Asking what course of action a Feyerabendian pluralist would have recommended in this scenario allows one to probe into the – limited, as it turns out – validity of some of Feyerabend’s views on theoretical pluralism.

Feyerabend’s humanitarian pluralism and its relevance for science-based policy

2024-09-02T14:30:10+00:00

A strong commitment to pluralism on multiple levels (methodological, theoretical, ontological as well as political) is a defining feature of Paul Feyerabend’s philosophical corpus. However, for Feyerabend, pluralism is not just an epistemologically preferable account within the philosophy of science. He also believes that pluralism is the only account of science that is compatible with a humanitarian outlook.

In the first part of this paper, I will reconstruct Feyerabend’s theoretical pluralism in the context of his criticism of Thomas Kuhn’s account. I will show that Feyerabend’s critical engagement with Kuhn’s model of scientific revolutions in the early 1960s was crucially important for the development of his own pluralistic account of science. In the second part, I will discuss and critically analyse the ethical-political stance that underlies Feyerabend’s pluralism. In the final part, I briefly summarize a series of papers that I have published together with Simon Lohse, in which we apply Feyerabend’s pluralism to current discussions about the role of evidence-based policy advice during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Wisdom, scientific expertise, and laypeople:

2024-09-02T14:26:29+00:00

Throughout his career, Feyerabend was seriously concerned with the authoritative role claimed by experts within democratic societies. He repeatedly argued that citizens should not be intimidated by the authority of science, and they should resist any attempt to strip themselves of their right to have a say in important social matters of public concern. We do not share Feyerabend’s anarchist approach to philosophy of science; nevertheless, we believe that some aspects of his philosophy of science can easily be incorporated into a constructive philosophy of scientific expertise. The aim of this essay is to argue for two theses that we believe have an unequivocal Feyerabendian “flavour”: a) that to be a good scientific expert, the scientist must be endowed with wisdom; and b) that public opinion is not limited to setting the goals that the scientific expert should take as exogenous data. In this way, we outline a normative model of the epistemic contributions that citizens and scientific experts can make to solve public problems.

Feyerabend, experts, and dilettantes

2024-09-02T14:21:16+00:00

Paul Feyerabend’s 1970 article “Experts in a Free Society” tries to make the case that scientific experts can only be tolerated if they are dilettantes. He uses Galileo, Newton and Kepler as examples of great scientists whose writing is nothing like that of contemporary “experts”, these latter being represented by the authors of the well-known book Human Sexual Response, Bill Masters and Virginia Johnson. He goes on to argue against the idea that the Scientific Revolution represented the triumph of empiricism.

I take issue with the way Feyerabend represents Galileo as implacably opposed to empiricism, with his supposition that good science requires a particular personality, and with the way in which he represents the work of Masters and Johnson.

Introduction: The role of experts in democratic societies: In honor of Paul K. Feyerabend

2024-09-02T14:16:05+00:00

Introduction to the Focus section of the issue XII, 1/2024

Consciousness lived through

2024-06-17T12:34:54+00:00

The paper aims to examine Brentano's account of inner consciousness and to assess its reception in Husserl's early works. Starting from the preliminary definition of psychic phenomena and an overview of some basic distinctions such as those between inner perception and observation, primary and secondary object, etc., I discuss Brentano's later thoughts in the light of his theory of relation and temporality, exposing a certain inconsistency with his initial assumptions. Subsequently, I examine Husserl's critical reception of inner consciousness in the Logical Investigations (1901) and in his lectures up to 1905, that is up to the first in-depth thematization of temporality, to which inner consciousness will be inextricably related. Indeed, Husserl’s redrafting of the inherited psychologistic lexicon helps to trace a prehistory of his phenomenology of time and to better understand the paradigmatic detachment of phenomenology from descriptive psychology.

Introduction: 15 Year of Discussion on Moral Enhancement

2023-11-21T16:53:47+00:00

Improvement in knowledge of the neurobiological bases of behavioural disposition with moral relevance have stimulated ethical reflection on the opportunity to employ biotechnological devices and resources to improve human morality (Clarke, Savulescu, Coady & Giubilini 2016). Discussion on biotechnological moral enhancement, as a separated issue from that of biotechnological cognitive human enhancement, has started after the publication of two seminal articles in 2008: “The Perils of Cognitive Enhancement and the Urgent Imperative to Enhance the Moral Character of Humanity” written by Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu, and “Moral Enhancement” written by Thomas Douglas.

What We Owe the Future: A Million-Year View, by William MacAskill

2023-11-21T16:50:35+00:00

Review of: What We Owe the Future: A Million-Year View, by William MacAskill,

London: Oneworld Publications, 2022; hardback, 352 pp., £20.00, ISBN: 9780861546138

Public Reason and Biotechnological Moral Enhancement of Criminal Offender

2023-11-21T16:47:33+00:00

There are two prominent classes of arguments in the debate on mandatory biotechnological moral enhancement (MBME) of criminal offenders. Some maintain that these interventions are not permissible because they do not respect some evaluative standards (my illustration is represented by autonomy). Others, however, argue that this type of intervention is legitimate. One of the latter argumentative lines appeals to the reduction of the high costs of incarceration. In this paper, I argue that such polarization in the debate suggests handling the problem of the protection of autonomy in the case of MBME of offenders as an allocative question. Moreover, I offer a novel approach to this question by adopting the Rawlsian method of public reason. According to this method, public decisions are legitimate only if they can be justified through reasons that can be accepted by each free, equal, and epistemically reasonable agent. I argue that, within this framework, for a specific class of criminal offenders, we can conclude that MBME, although undermining a certain form of autonomy, could be legitimately mandatory. Because of reasonable pluralism, the final verdict on legitimacy is made based on the results of fair procedures of decision-making among proposals supported by persons in a condition of reasonable disagreement.

Internal and External Moral Enhancements: The Ethical Parity Principle and the Case for a Prioritization

2023-11-21T16:40:52+00:00

Is there any moral difference between internal moral enhancements, which directly affect the biological nature of human beings, and external moral enhancements, which nudge choices and behavior without changing human biology? If Neil Levy's Ethical Parity Principle is applied, the answer should be no. Recently, John Danaher has argued that the Ethical Parity Principle is invalid and that there are ethical and political reasons for a prioritization of internal over external moral enhancements. Although Danaher's argument presents some interesting insights, it needs to be corrected with finer-grained distinctions of the types of moral enhancements.

Moral Knowledge, by Sarah McGrath

2023-02-08T10:23:14+00:00

Review of Moral Knowledge, by Sarah McGrath, Oxford University Press, 2019, x, 218 pages.

The Main Enterprise of the World: Rethinking Education, by Philip Kitcher

2023-02-08T10:16:41+00:00

Review of "The Main Enterprise of the World: Rethinking Education" by Philip Kitcher, Oxford University Press, 2022, xiv, 416 pages

Responses to Critics

2022-12-03T00:57:21+00:00

Tenenbaum on Instrumental Reason and the End of Procrastination

2022-11-22T15:03:07+00:00

In Rational Powers in Action, Sergio Tenenbaum argues that instrumental rationality is constitutively rationality in action. According to his theory, we not only reason to action, we also reason from action: both the major premise and the conclusion of instrumental reasoning are intentional actions in progress. In the paper, I raise three objections. First, the view rests on the assumption of a symmetry between the starting point and the conclusion of instrumental reasoning. But in the cases of telic actions like building a house, the reasoning concludes with the completion of the action. Secondly, Tenenbaum conceives of the nexus between ends and means generally in terms of the relation between a temporally extended whole and its parts. This fails to account for distinction between telic action and conduct or praxis. Third, the theory implies that it is instrumentally irrational to abandon all of one’s ends. But this can’t be shown.

The Action-Guidingness of Rational Principles and the Problem of our own Imperfections

2022-11-14T18:31:25+00:00

The following comment discusses the supposedly action-guiding role of rational principles and the question to what extent our imperfections as human agents should influence what these principles are. According to Sergio Tenenbaum, the principles of instrumental rationality (as stated in his theory) are meant to be action-guiding rather than merely evaluative. In the first part of the comment I look at how this action-guiding role is to be understood, especially when it comes to the pursuit of long-term indeterminate ends. The second part of the comment raises the question of whether the principles included in Tenenbaum’s Extended Theory of Rationality should be supplemented by principles for dealing with our own imperfections. I consider two possible sources for further principles: the risk that we will behave irrationally later on and uncertainty about the effectiveness of the means we take.

The Extended Theory of Instrumental Rationality and Means-Ends Coherence

2022-11-14T18:23:15+00:00

In Rational Powers in Action, Sergio Tenenbaum sets out a new theory of instrumental rationality that departs from standard discussions of means-ends coherence in the literature on structural rationality in at least two interesting ways: it takes intentional action (as opposed to intention) to be what puts in place the relevant instrumental requirements, and it applies to both necessary and non-necessary means. I consider these two developments in more detail. On the first, I argue that Tenenbaum’s theory is too narrow since there could be instrumental irrationality with respect to an intention to f even if one is not yet engaged in any relevant intentional action. On the second, I argue against Tenenbaum’s claim that “an agent is instrumentally irrational if she knowingly fails to pursue some sufficient means to an end she is pursuing.”

Instrumental Rationality and Proceeding Acceptably over Time

2022-11-14T18:16:40+00:00

Theories of instrumental rationality often abstract away from the fact that actions are generally temporally extended and from crucial complications associated with this fact. Sergio Tenenbaum’s Rational Powers in Action (2020) reveals and navigates these complications with great acuity, ultimately providing a powerful revisionary picture of instrumental rationality that highlights the extremely limited nature of the standard picture. Given that I share Tenenbaum’s general concerns about the standard picture, my aim is to advance our general approach further by complicating and enriching debate regarding a picture of instrumental rationality that is accountable to the temporally extended nature of our actions and agency via the consideration of a few issues that merit further consideration and exploration. As I explain, despite stemming from or being associated with some important insights, some of the central ideas that Tenenbaum supports need to be qualified, modified, or reconsidered.

Rational Powers and Inaction

2022-11-14T18:05:54+00:00

This discussion of Sergio Tenenbaum’s excellent book, Rational Powers in Action, focuses on two noteworthy aspects of the big picture. First, questions are raised about Tenenbaum’s methodology of giving primacy to cases in which the agent has all the requisite background knowledge, including knowledge of a means that will be sufficient for achieving her end, and no significant false beliefs. Second, the implications of Tenenbaum’s views concerning the rational constraints on revising our ends are examined.

Précis of Rational Powers in Action

2022-11-14T17:44:47+00:00

Human actions unfold over time, in pursuit of ends that are not fully specified in advance. Rational Powers in Action locates these features of the human condition at the heart of a new theory of instrumental rationality. Where many theories of rational agency focus on instantaneous choices between sharply defined outcomes, treating the temporally extended and partially open-ended character of action as an afterthought, this book argues that the deep structure of instrumental rationality can only be understood if we see how it governs the pursuit of long-term, indeterminate ends. These are ends that cannot be realized through a single momentary action, and whose content leaves partly open what counts as realizing the end. For example, one cannot simply write a book through an instantaneous choice to do so; over time, one must execute a variety of actions to realize one’s goal of writing a book, where one may do a better or worse job of attaining that goal, and what counts as succeeding at it is not fully determined in advance. Even to explain the rational governance of much less ambitious actions like making dinner, this book argues that we need to focus on temporal duration and the indeterminacy of ends in intentional action. Theories of moment-by-moment preference maximization, or indeed any understanding of instrumental rationality on the basis of momentary mental items, cannot capture the fundamental structure of our instrumentally rational capacities. This book puts forward a theory of instrumental rationality as rationality in action.

Can Nonexistent Mathematical Objects Make a Difference? Meinongianism, indispensability argument and mathematical entanglement

2023-11-22T09:08:19+00:00

One of the arguments that most influence the debate on the existence of mathematical objects is undoubtedly the indispensability argument. Central to this argument is the Quinean ontic thesis that we are committed to the existence of all the entities we (indispensably) quantify over in our best scientific theories. But what if a different meta-ontological paradigm is adopted? In this paper, I propose a Meinongian interpretation of the indispensability argument. The new reading of the indispensability argument, in accordance with heavy duty platonism, allows me to introduce a new notion of metaphysical dependence that goes by the name of mathematical entanglement, and to conclude that nonexistent mathematical objects make a difference to the concrete, physical world.

Husserl’s Legacy. Phenomenology, Metaphysics and Transcendental Philosophy, by Dan Zahavi

2022-09-09T13:40:51+00:00

Book review of Dan Zahavi’s Husserl’s Legacy. Phenomenology, Metaphysics and Transcendental Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017.

Ethics, Conflict and Medical Treatment for Children: From Disagreement to Dissensus, by D. Wilkinson & J. Savulescu

2022-09-09T13:37:43+00:00

Review of D. Wilkinson & J. Savulescu Ethics, Conflict and Medical Treatment for Children: From Disagreement to Dissensus, Elsevier, 2019, 192 pages.

The Birth of Habits

2022-07-29T11:27:32+00:00

This journal issue presents, for the first time in English, Victor Egger’s short essay La naissance des habitudes, published in 1880 in the “Annales de la Faculté des Lettres de Bordeaux” (n. 1, pp. 209-223). The translation is based on the original text, the page numbering of which is indicated in square brackets. In order to facilitate the reader’s understanding of some of Egger’s examples, in some cases, the original French is provided in a footnote. Egger’s notes can be found at the foot of the page. Bibliographical additions and translators’ notes are placed between square brackets.
The translation of the quotations included in the text is by the translators unless otherwise indicated. We warmly thank Carolyn Benson for the expertise with which she revised this translation.

Victor Egger: habit, repetition, and the unconscious

2022-07-29T11:25:40+00:00

not available

Betting and Presuming: From God’s Existence to Morality and Law

2022-07-29T11:23:16+00:00

Pascal famously argued that since God transcends the rational domain of demonstration, we must bet on his existence. Less famously, Leibniz claimed that in the absence of a full-fledged demonstration of God’s existence, we at least have to presume, that is to say, to assume, that he exists until the contrary is proved. Aside from marking a significant contrast between these two leading figures of modern philosophy (Leibniz would later reproach Pascal for having “paid attention only to moral arguments”), these two stances are at the origin of two independent developments: decision theory and presumptive reasoning, respectively. In this paper we will provide a critical account of Pascal’s and Leibniz’s lines of thought by first presenting the original arguments and then reconstructing them in light of the developments they gave rise to. Finally, we will advance some remarks about the interplay of presumption and probability in Leibniz’s approach to morality and law.

Probable Interplay: Reactions to Epicureanism and Probabilism in the Seventeenth Century

2022-07-29T11:21:02+00:00

Scholastic probabilism regulated the use of opinions in much of seventeenth-century Catholic moral theology. It should therefore not come as a surprise that it also affected the acceptance of philosophical doctrines like epicureanism in Catholic countries. The ups and downs in the careers of probabilism and epicureanism in Italy are in conspicuous synch as this paper will show, with special emphasis on the Jesuit Cardinal Francesco ‘Pietro’ Sforza Pallavicino. Pallavicino (1607–1667) was one of the leading probabilists of his time and sympathetically discussed epicurean positions in Del bene (1644). Probabilism’s license to favor the convenience and utility of agents in doubt about moral restrictions facilitated the adoption of epicurean attitudes, while opponents criticized probabilism for promoting the ‘prudence of the flesh’, a topos of longstanding anti-epicurean pedigree. The rising storm of opposition against probabilism in the second half of the seventeenth century thus contributed to a worsening of conditions for the spread of epicurean thought, with observable effects in Italy.

The Baby Jesus in a Drop of Blood: Evidence, Credibility, and Truth in Post-Reformation Catholicism

2022-07-29T11:18:42+00:00

In the spring of 1693, a strange occurrence shook up the peaceful little town of Bolsena. While visiting the site of the well-known medieval miracle, Agostino Berton, a hemp and textile seller, witnessed yet another miracle: the apparition of an image of the baby Jesus inside a drop of blood. In this essay, I examine the investigation conducted by the Roman leaders over this case and discuss its implications for the relationship between credibility and truth in seventeenth-century Catholicism. Over the course of the Middle Ages, theologians, canonists, and jurists had provided an important reconsideration of the category of credibility as both a feature of the Christian faith and a necessary (and, in some cases, sufficient) basis for legal judgment. By the early modern times, credibility had come to occupy a central place in Catholic discourse. This centrality led to novel insight into the relationship between truth and evidence, faith and belief, causing new moral, doctrinal, and epistemological tensions. My essay uses Agostino's story as a springboard to explore some of those tensions.

Melchor Cano and the conundrum of historical scholarship: Probability and criticism in the sixteenth century

2022-07-29T11:17:21+00:00

This article discusses the role played by the rhetorical-judicial notion of verisimilitude in the sixteenth-century rise of historical criticism. Embracing a dialectical conception of historical facts as something that needed to be extremely probable rather than logically necessary, early modern authors became increasingly concerned with the development of critical tools of verification. Borrowed from the medieval judicial tradition—influenced in turn by classical rhetoric and dialectics—these tools aimed at assessing historical sources and accounts based on their inherent degree of verisimilitude. The judicial background of these tools of assessment explains the rise of historical criticism in environments that were influenced by the innovative legal and philological tradition of the mos gallicus (e.g., François Baudouin, Jean Bodin). Yet, at the same time, it also explains the emergence of similar critical notions among authors who independently integrated humanist, late scholastic, and canonistic interests. This was the case, for instance, with Melchor Cano (d. 1560), whose De locis theologicis predate both Baudoin’s and Bodin’s works, providing one of the earliest examples of a fully developed method of historical criticism.