Punishment from an Hegelian perspective

Abstract

 This paper proposes that verbal insult as a serious crime should receive severe punishment. This principle is established based on Hegel’s perspective, that punishment should aim at restoring the injured universal recognition caused by the crime. Verbal insult is a severe crime because of the damage it inflicts on the universal will, thus the social and political contexts in terms of recognition. This also means that in Hegel’s advocacy of punishment to fit the crime, the considerations he gave on the crime’s effects on social and political contexts is a result of his primary importance given to mutual recognition. There is a common misconception that Hegel is a retributivist, which is mainly reflected by most discussions on Hegel’s theories of punishment focusing narrowly on the part of Abstract Right in his Philosophy of Right. Focusing narrowly in this part causes a lack of consideration taken into how crime and punishment should be treated after Abstract Right has been actualised into Objective Right. This paper focuses on this neglected aspect and discusses the importance of recognition restoration and contextual influences in the Objective Reality of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) in Hegel’s theory of punishment.