Getting the phenomenology of "rule-following" right

Abstract

Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s rule-following puzzle characterizes the phenomenology of rule-following in a specific way that has been extremely influential. It is claimed in this paper that the specifics of the puzzle, in particular, the prominent role that “normativity” plays in Kripke’s interpretation and in the subsequent literature turns on a misdescription of the human experience of rule following. In particular, the experience is distorted by projecting back into the experience of arithmetical calculation and language use how rules are experienced when these skills are first learnt as opposed to later when an agent has mastered them. There is also a sharp distinction between cognizing, when one exercises one’s knowledge skills, and metacognizing, when one think about those skills and what is involved in them. When the experience of “rule following” is recalibrated to take account of these differences, avenues to other solutions to the puzzle become available.