Nature, agency, and the nature of agency

Autori

  • Kenneth Walden Dartmouth College

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4454/philinq.v6i2.226

Parole chiave:

agency, practical reason, constitutivism, art, Elijah Millgram,

Abstract

I examine skeptical arguments about the constitutive nature of agency, with special attention to those of Elijah Millgram. I suggest that these arguments lead us not to the conclusion that agency has no such nature, but that it is an essentially contested kind in the same way that art is. I argue that this undermines traditional forms of constitutivism in metaethics but opens the door to a different way of pursuing the same program. Finally, I take issue with Millgram’s solution to the problem of “logical aliens” and suggest an alternative based my analogy with art.

##submission.downloads##

Pubblicato

2018-08-01

Fascicolo

Sezione

Focus