Tractatus 5.1362

Autori

  • Giovanni Mion Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Faculty of Science and Letters Istanbul Technical University 34469 Maslak – Istanbul Turkey

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4454/philinq.v5i1.167

Parole chiave:

Wittgenstein, Tractatus, free will, future contingencies, verificationism.

Abstract

The paper analyzes the conception of free will defended by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, and in contrast to Pasquale Frascolla’s verificationist reading of 5.1362, it argues that Wittgenstein’s conception of free will squarely places future contingencies within the boundaries of truth-conditional semantics.

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Pubblicato

2017-01-17

Fascicolo

V. 5 N. 1 (2017)

Sezione

Essays

Licenza

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