Internal Reasons and the Limits of Philosophy

Autori

  • Catherine Wilson University of York

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4454/philinq.v4i1.144

Parole chiave:

morality, Williams, utilitarianism, demandingness, practical reason, moral motivation, internal reasons, external reasons

Abstract

Williams's views on the importance of internal reasons and his denial that there can be reasons for an agent to do something that have no relationship to their extendible motivational set are the key to his critical view of moral theory and moral theorists. The paper offers a qualified defense of his position on both counts, noting where adjustments to it are needed.

Biografia autore

Catherine Wilson, University of York

Professor of Philosophy

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Pubblicato

2016-01-24

Fascicolo

V. 4 N. 1 (2016)

Sezione

Focus

Licenza

Il copyright è ceduto dall'autore all'editore per 18 mesi dalla pubblicazione. Trascorso questo periodo di tempo, ai contenuti è attribuita una licenza CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 (Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International).