Free Will Is Compatible With Randomness
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.4454/philinq.v4i2.149Keywords:
Free will, randomnessAbstract
It is frequently claimed that randomness conflicts with free will because, if our actions are the result of purely random events, we must lack control over them. The paper challenges this view. After arguing for a product rather than a process notion of randomness, it uses an intuitive two-stage, contextual definition of free choice to show that, relative to this definition, randomness is compatible with free will. But we also stress that the argument is relative in nature: the conclusion holds only if free will is itself metaphysically possible, a claim that is beyond the purview of the paper.
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