Internal and External Moral Enhancements: The Ethical Parity Principle and the Case for a Prioritization

Authors

  • Matteo Galletti University of Florence

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4454/philinq.v11i2.492

Keywords:

Moral Enhancement, Behavioral Ethics, Nudge, Procedural Moral Enhancement, Ethical Parity Principle

Abstract

Is there any moral difference between internal moral enhancements, which directly affect the biological nature of human beings, and external moral enhancements, which nudge choices and behavior without changing human biology? If Neil Levy's Ethical Parity Principle is applied, the answer should be no. Recently, John Danaher has argued that the Ethical Parity Principle is invalid and that there are ethical and political reasons for a prioritization of internal over external moral enhancements. Although Danaher's argument presents some interesting insights, it needs to be corrected with finer-grained distinctions of the types of moral enhancements.

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Published

2024-01-24

Issue

Vol. 11 No. 2 (2023)

Section

Focus

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