Free Will Is Compatible With Randomness

Authors

  • Cristian Calude University of Auckland
  • Frederick Kroon University of Auckland
  • Nemanja Poznanovic University of Auckland

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4454/philinq.v4i2.149

Keywords:

Free will, randomness

Abstract

It is frequently claimed that randomness conflicts with free will because, if our actions are the result of purely random events, we must lack control over them. The paper challenges this view. After arguing for a product rather than a process notion of randomness, it uses an intuitive two-stage, contextual definition of free choice to show that, relative to this definition, randomness is compatible with free will. But we also stress that the argument is relative in nature: the conclusion holds only if free will is itself metaphysically possible, a claim that is beyond the purview of the paper.

Author Biographies

Cristian Calude, University of Auckland

Professor of Computer Science, University of Auckland

Frederick Kroon, University of Auckland

Professor of Philosophy, University of Auckland

Nemanja Poznanovic, University of Auckland

Postgraduate student, Department of Computer Science

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Published

2016-07-09

Issue

Vol. 4 No. 2 (2016)

Section

Essays

License

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