Shared Knowledge from Individual Vice: the Role of Unworthy Epistemic Emotions

Authors

  • Adam Morton

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4454/philinq.v2i1.82

Abstract

This paper begins with a discussion the role of less-than-admirable epistemic
emotions in our respectable, indeed admirable inquiries: nosiness, obsessiveness, wishful thinking, denial, partisanship. The explanation for their desirable effect is Mandevillian: because of the division of epistemic labour individual epistemic vices can lead to shared knowledge. In fact it is sometimes essential to it.

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Published

2014-01-20

Issue

Vol. 2 No. 1 (2014)

Section

Focus

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