Emotion and affect in the space of reasons
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.4454/philinq.v10i1.392Keywords:
Wilfrid Sellars, behaviorism, rationality, emotion, affectAbstract
Wilfrid Sellars’s conception of “the space of reasons” makes critical assumptions about what constitutes persons and human uniqueness. Specifically, Sellars assumes that being human is defined through rationality. Although unique to Sellars, defining humans through rationality is an assumption not without its problems. I trace historical and contemporary issues with ignoring emotion and affect in our definition of persons and attempt to reconcile Sellars’s commitment to behaviorism with a seeming conflict between rationality and emotion.
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