Blameworthiness, willings, and practical decisions

Authors

  • E.J. Coffman THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4454/philinq.v9i1.293

Keywords:

Moral responsibility, Blameworthiness, Resultant moral luck, Action, Willing, Practical decision

Abstract

What kinds of things can we be morally responsible for?  Andrew Khoury offers an answer that includes (i) an argument for the impossibility of blameworthiness for overt action, and (ii) the assertion that “willings are the proper object of responsibility in the context of action”.  After presenting an argument for the inconsistency of Khoury’s answer to our focal question, I defend the following partial answer that resembles, but differs importantly from, Khoury’s answer: one can be blameworthy for a practical decision—that is, an essentially intentional momentary mental action of forming an intention to do something that resolves prior felt unsettledness about what to do.

Author Biography

E.J. Coffman, THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

PROFESSOR

Published

2021-02-25

Issue

Section

Essays