Problems for hard moral particularism: Can we really dismiss general reasons?

Authors

  • Dario Cecchini FINO Consortium, Università di Genova

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4454/philinq.v8i2.256

Keywords:

Moral Particularism, Particularism vs Generalism debate, Moral reasons, Usefulness of Moral Principles

Abstract

Moral particularism, in its extreme version, is the theory that argues that there are no invariant context-independent moral reasons. It states also that moral knowledge is not constituted by principles and that these are useless or harmful in practice. In this paper, I intend to argue that this position takes context-sensitiveness of reasons too seriously and has to face many philosophical problems—mainly because its most important argument (the argument from holism of reasons) is not convincing but also because a pluralist generalist account is preferable both from metaethical and normative points of view.


Author Biography

Dario Cecchini, FINO Consortium, Università di Genova

PhD student by FINO Constortium, Università di Genova.

Published

2020-07-20

Issue

Section

Essays