Problems for hard moral particularism: Can we really dismiss general reasons?
Keywords:Moral Particularism, Particularism vs Generalism debate, Moral reasons, Usefulness of Moral Principles
Moral particularism, in its extreme version, is the theory that argues that there are no invariant context-independent moral reasons. It states also that moral knowledge is not constituted by principles and that these are useless or harmful in practice. In this paper, I intend to argue that this position takes context-sensitiveness of reasons too seriously and has to face many philosophical problems—mainly because its most important argument (the argument from holism of reasons) is not convincing but also because a pluralist generalist account is preferable both from metaethical and normative points of view.
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