Co-location and separability

Authors

  • John Biro University of Florida

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4454/philinq.v4i2.93

Keywords:

pluralism, co-location, material object

Abstract

I propose that it is a conceptual truth about material objects that if two of them are truly distinct, it must be possible for them to be in different places. If this is so, those who maintain that sometimes – as with a statue and a piece of clay – two distinct objects are located in the same place cannot be right, since the objects they allege are co-located fail to satisfy this condition. I consider the ways in which a pluralist might try to block the conclusion and find them wanting.

Author Biography

John Biro, University of Florida

Professor of philosophy

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Published

2016-06-29

Issue

Vol. 4 No. 2 (2016)

Section

Essays

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