Epistemic paternalism and epistemic value*
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.4454/philinq.v1i2.53Keywords:
Epistemology, Epistemic Value, Knowledge, Paternalism, Understanding, True Belief, Veritism,Abstract
My concern is with the merits (or otherwise) of a form of paternalism which is specifically epistemic, one that mirrors familiar forms of paternalism in the ethical and political spheres. To this end, I critically explore Alvin Goldman’s seminal discussion of this topic, which runs along veritistic lines. While broadly sympathetic to the general position that Goldman develops in this regard, I argue that in order to properly evaluate the potential of epistemic paternalism we need to broaden our focus away from veritism and consider also the special value that attaches to certain epistemic standings.*Invited paper
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Published
2013-07-31
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Essays
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