The Concept of Involvement and the Paradox of Fiction

Authors

  • Paolo Spinicci Università degli Studi di Milano

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4454/philinq.v2i1.48

Keywords:

Imagination, emotion, Theory of Fiction

Abstract

I will divide my paper into two parts. First of all, I will discuss, three tentative solutions of the paradox of fiction which are, in my opinion, untenable. In arguing against these theories a special weight will be given to a single question: why and how is it possible to calm someone by repeating that what they are reading or looking at is a fiction? In the second part, I will suggest a realistic and anti-judgmentalist solution of the paradox. It rests on what I believe to be general features of imagination, but it also implies an understanding of the primary relation of involvement – a relation which somehow echoes Heidegger’s notion of Befindlichkeit. A concluding remark is devoted to the origin of the paradox: in my opinion it is not only an aftermath of a cognitive theory of emotion, but it is also a clue of a mistaken behavior toward fiction

Author Biography

Paolo Spinicci, Università degli Studi di Milano

Department of Philosophy

Full Professor

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Published

2014-01-20

Issue

Vol. 2 No. 1 (2014)

Section

Essays

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