Interviews on the history of late analytic philosophy

Guido Bonino and Paolo Tripodi

As editors of this special issue, we thought it useful to ask the same three questions on the history of late analytic philosophy to some philosophers.

(1) What are the main philosophical and metaphilosophical similarities and differences between early analytic philosophy and late analytic philosophy?
(2) Is it possible to identify a mainstream in late analytic philosophy? If so, what are its main (cultural, ideological, philosophical, methodological, metaphilosophical) features?
(3) What are, in your view, the main critical and controversial aspects of late analytic philosophy?

We warmly thank all the interviewees for their collaboration and their interesting answers.

Guido Bonino
University of Turin
guido.bonino@unito.it

Paolo Tripodi
University of Turin
paolo.tripodi@unito.it

philinq VI, 1-2018, pp. 15-50
ISSN (print) 2281-8618-ETS

Thomas R. Baldwin
University of York

1) In response to your first question concerning the main differences and similarities between early and late analytical philosophy, I begin by pointing to the title of this issue, namely *History of Late Analytic Philosophy*. For one of the main differences is precisely the historical self-consciousness of contemporary analytical philosophy as opposed to the largely ahistorical manifestos of the early period, when the leaders of this "revolution in philosophy" taught that their new method of logico-analytic philosophy provided philosophy with a new beginning. By contrast in this later period there is much debate concerning the history of the emergence of analytical philosophy, for example concerning the importance of Bolzano's contributions to logic and the philosophy of language. Not surprisingly, however, the most important difference concerns the conception of analysis and its role in philosophy. In the early period the emphasis on analysis was part of a critical dialectic aimed against the idealist holism of philosophers such as F.H. Bradley. Philosophical analysis was conceived as a way of getting back to the ontological and/or epistemological foundations of some area of inquiry, such as ethics or knowledge of the physical world. However analysis of this kind had been employed by many philosophers of the past and the move that was central to the development of analytical philosophy as a distinctive type of philosophy was the emphasis on the logical analysis of language based on the new logical theories of Frege, Russell and others. For this led to Wittgenstein's new analytical conception of philosophy as an activity, as the logical clarification of thoughts and critique of language.

This conception came under pressure from later analytic philosophers, most notably Quine and Davidson, who argued that the conception of philosophy as an inquiry into linguistic "conceptual schemes" separated off from the content of scientific and other inquiries was misconceived. Hence later analytical philosophers have been happy to embrace "naturalism" in its many forms so that they can connect philosophical arguments with evidence from cognitive psychology, evolutionary theory, theoretical physics and other scientific disciplines. Nowhere is this difference more apparent than in ethics. In the early period analytical ethics was primarily metaethics, the inquiry into the metaphysics of value and the "language of morals". But in this later period, ethics is a much broader family of inquiries which addresses practical questions in the context of debates in bioethics, political philosophy, feminism and so on while also addressing debates about practical rationality and the foundation of values.

2) This shift to a conception of philosophy which seeks to make connections with other disciplines of many different kinds invites your second question concerning a "mainstream" of contemporary analytical philosophy. For once philosophy is not thought of as the conceptual analysis of language separated from substantive theories of the world it is important to clarify how there can be a distinctively "analytical" style of philosophy at all. In part the answer to this is that even when one has repudiated the analytic/synthetic distinction there is no need to abandon the activity of analysis informed by logical and semantic theory (as the work of Quine and Davidson shows); and it is a mark of analytical philosophy that it continues to attach central significance to analyses of these kinds, although the analyses are usually conceived as identifying and systematising the connections between propositions rather than identifying basic foundations, epistemological or metaphysical. More generally, contemporary analytical philosophy preserves an enduring commitment to a style of philosophical writing which values the construction of explicit arguments for the positions that are being advanced and a reflective self-consciousness concerning the assumptions inherent in these arguments. This commitment to disciplined argument remains the core of analytical philosophy, but it is now applied in a much broader way, in the development of new transcendental arguments and criticism of them, in the construction of thought experiments and reflection on their significance, and equally in the wide range of formal techniques that are now used in metaphysics, epistemology, and decision theory as well as in logic and the philosophy of mathematics. This commitment has been especially prominent in logic itself in the development of non-classical logics of many kinds, including the construction and defence of paraconsistent logics which allow for true contradictions. Similarly there has been an explosion of work in modal logic, especially concerning the logic of counterfactuals and epistemic modals; and an important feature of work in these areas is that because the boundaries between semantic truth-conditions and pragmatic appraisals are not clear, philosophers of language have developed sophisticated theories which combine semantic and pragmatic considerations.

3) But to turn, finally, to your third question concerning the "main critical and controversial aspects of late analytical philosophy", one such aspect is this variety of formal and informal methods of argument which demand expertise that is not widely shared, with the result that many important new contributions to analytical philosophy command only a small readership. A different issue arises from the way in which contemporary analytical philosophy sometimes draws upon natural science, for this gives rise to the suspicion that philosophical questions can be dealt with by purely scientific inquiries. But this suspicion

is misconceived: take, for example, the question as to what causation amounts to. While contemporary physics is obviously relevant to this issue, especially to the question of backwards causation, there remain many debates about causation that are not going to be settled by physical theory alone, for example how causal claims relate to counterfactuals and to natural laws, whether causation is best conceived as the exercise of causal powers, how far pragmatic considerations determine the identification of causes and so on. Similarly in the philosophy of mind while there are many ways in which discussions of intentionality and mental content have been moved forward by investigations of animal behaviour and cognitive science, there remain long-standing puzzles about our capacity for making mistakes and for rational conduct which do not appear to admit of empirical solutions. Take the case of rational conduct: it is not easy to understand how mental content can enter into the explanation of behaviour that involves physical changes which, on the face of it, should be susceptible of a purely physical explanation. There are many different ways of attempting to show how appearances here can be preserved and this is not the place to attempt to adjudicate between them; but one thing that is clear is that this is not a question that is going to be resolved by a straightforward empirical inquiry. So the "naturalism" of contemporary analytical philosophy is not, I think, a proper cause for alarm that philosophy is being tacitly assimilated into natural science; instead, properly understood, it is a recognition that philosophical questions reach out into inquiries of all kinds, including those of natural science.

I started my comments by noting the reference to 'history' in the title *History of Late Analytic Philosophy*; I end by commenting on another term used in the title – 'late'. For to describe a stage in some temporally extended process or event as "late" is normally to imply that it comes shortly before the end; thus Wittgenstein's "late" philosophy is the philosophy that he constructed in the last stage of his life. So to write of contemporary analytical philosophy as "late analytic philosophy" is to suggest that it is the final stage of analytical philosophy. Is there any reason to accept this suggestion? Richard Rorty famously argued that analytical philosophy assumes that our thoughts represent the world in a way which does not depend on the world so that they can then be compared with it and assessed as true or false. Invoking Davidson's criticism of the scheme/content dualism, Rorty argued that because this founding assumption of analytical philosophy is an illusion, analytical philosophy is misconceived, and philosophical debates should be recast as "edifying" discourses in which later thinkers discuss the works of earlier philosophers without, however, aiming to argue for their truth or falsehood. As my earlier comments indicate, I see no good reason to accept Rorty's sceptical argument. So contemporary analytical philosophy is not "late".

Michael Beaney
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin and King's College, London

1) As I see it, analytic philosophy has two main sources: Frege's creation of modern quantificational logic and its use in his logicist project, and Russell's and Moore's rebellion against British idealism. Filtered through the linguistic turn effected by Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, this gave rise to two main strands in early analytic philosophy, the Moore/Wittgenstein "ordinary language" strand and the Frege/Russell "ideal language" strand; and analytic philosophy can be seen as developing through the creative tension between these two strands. The term 'analytic philosophy' was only introduced in the 1930s, at first to describe the Cambridge School of Analysis, but it soon came to include logical positivism as well, and the extension of the term has broadened ever since, both backwards, sidewards, and forwards in history. As a result, the most substantial difference between early and late analytic philosophy is that the latter now includes considerably more as analytic philosophy has ramified into all areas of philosophy, building on the work of more and more philosophers and expanding the topics and themes it addresses. For virtually every subfield of philosophy, there is now an "analytic" version – from analytic aesthetics and analytic feminism to analytic phenomenology and analytic theology.

This broadening of analytic philosophy has gone hand-in-hand with an expansion of its methodological toolbox. This includes a wide range of analytic techniques, from conceptual analysis, logical formalization, contextual definition, and the use of abstraction principles to identifying presuppositions, constructing counterexamples, elaborating thought experiments, and testing "intuitions". One might suggest that there has been a shift over time from reductive to more connective forms of analysis, to use a distinction first drawn by P.F. Strawson (see my entry on "Analysis" in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*), but the important development to highlight is the enlargement and refinement of these techniques and their application to more and more philosophical problems and domains of thought.

This raises the question as to what the similarities are between what is going on in analytic philosophy today and the work of its founders. Perhaps a short answer might be given in terms of their use of the methodological toolbox, but a full answer can only be provided by explaining the relevant historical developments. (See M. Beaney, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, 2013. I elaborate on what I have just said here in my two introductory essays: "What is analytic philosophy?" and "The historiography of analytic philosophy").

2) Some philosophers might suggest that naturalism now pervades late analytic philosophy to a much greater extent than it did in early analytic philosophy. In a weak sense of naturalism, whereby appeals to anything "supernatural" or to any kind of transcendental realm are rejected, this might be true. In a stronger sense of naturalism, according to which the natural sciences are seen as providing the methodological model for philosophy, I do not think that this is true – and I certainly hope that it is not true, as such a view is profoundly mistaken. As far as arguments, assumptions, concepts, doctrines, ideas, positions, problems, themes, theories, or topics are concerned, I do not think that there is anything to which appeal might be made in characterizing any "mainstream". And even if we see there as being a common methodological toolbox, there is such widespread variation in the tools that are selected, and the uses to which they are put, that talk of any mainstream in this respect, too, is unlikely to be helpful.

Let me offer one answer, however, to raise a rather different issue that I suspect will become increasingly controversial over the next few decades. Analytic philosophy has spread throughout the world, with Societies for Analytic Philosophy established in very many non-English-speaking countries. Many works of analytic philosophy written in English have been translated into other languages and analytic philosophy is now discussed in these other languages. But as far as this linguistic dimension is concerned, *English-language* analytic philosophy is nevertheless the mainstream. This has one enormous benefit: there is now a universal language in which we can all discuss analytic philosophy and anyone who is competent in this language can publish in "international" journals, where "international" is often a euphemism for "English-speaking". Yet there are also many downsides. If there is anything to the view that our thought is partly determined by our language (and I think there is), then the restriction to just one language, however rich and global it becomes, is of deep philosophical concern for all sorts of reasons. I mention just three here. First, discussing philosophy only in English threatens to obscure the concepts and elide the fine-grained distinctions that may be characteristic of other languages and that reveal alternative ways of experiencing and thinking. Second, the importance of the history of philosophy for philosophy (in which I also believe) means that we want philosophers properly trained in the relevant languages if historical texts are to be kept alive and revisited in the light of later developments. Third, I see the ability to translate from one language into another as important a philosophical skill as knowing how to formalize propositions and arguments in logic. Allowing philosophy to be pursued only or even primarily in English would, in my view, be an intellectual catastrophe.

3) I have already mentioned one critical and controversial aspect of late analytic philosophy – the dominance of the English language. This is related to what I regard as its main critical and controversial aspect – its continued opposition to so-called "continental philosophy", though I must immediately say that I find the latter term extremely unhelpful, encompassing as it now seems to do a whole range of rather different traditions, from German idealism, neo-Kantianism, and hermeneutics to phenomenology, existentialism, and deconstruction. This opposition takes many forms, from failure to engage based simply on ignorance to outright hostility and antagonism. It is increasingly misleading to characterize this as an opposition between English-language and other-European-language philosophy, but there are certainly German-language and French-language traditions that offer challenges to analytic philosophy. These challenges need to be taken much more seriously than most analytic philosophers seem prepared to admit, although in recent years there has been a concerted effort in some quarters to facilitate dialogue, which I greatly welcome.

In my recent book (*Analytic Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press, 2017), I identify two criticisms of analytic philosophy that deeper engagement with "continental" traditions helps appreciate. One concerns its naturalist tendencies on which I have already commented. The other concerns its ahistoricist and even anti-historicist tendencies. As also noted above, I believe that history of philosophy is essential to philosophy. Let me mention three reasons for holding this view, too (and for fuller discussion, see the second essay cited at the end of my answer to the first question). First, even if innovations are made with no apparent reference to the past, sooner or later they will need to be clarified and defended by locating them in the historical space of previous views. Second, all philosophical debates and doctrines involve presuppositions that may only become clear with sufficient historical distance and against the wider historical background. Third, there may also be all sorts of potentially misleading or obscure allusions, analogies, metaphors, and intertextual references at play in philosophical thinking and writing that can only be identified through historical work. In appreciating these three reasons, and in responding to the criticisms of analytic philosophy that they imply, we can certainly benefit from the greater historical self-consciousness of most of the various traditions of "continental" philosophy.

Cora Diamond
University of Virginia

1) [Prof. Diamond's reformulation of the first question is: What are the main philosophical and metaphilosophical differences between early, middle and late analytic philosophy?] I take a characteristic and central feature of early analytic philosophy to be a conception of logic and of its significance for philosophy. This conception can be seen in Russell's "Logic as the Essence of Philosophy" in *Our Knowledge of the External World*. One part of logic, on this view, "investigates what propositions are and what forms they may have"; the other part contains completely general logical propositions. The profound philosophical significance of the first part was emphasized by Russell; and a form of the same idea carries over into Wittgenstein's thinking. Both parts of what Russell speaks of as logic are important also in Frege's writings. A descendant of what Russell thought of as the first part of logic also plays a significant role in the middle period of analytic philosophy, as can be seen, for example, in the use of the word 'logic' in the title, *Logic and Language*, of two collections of essays illustrative of mid-century analytic philosophy, edited by A.G.N. Flew. That title also illustrates the importance of attention to language in mid-century analytic philosophy. While the importance of attention to language can be traced back to early analytic philosophy, especially to the *Tractatus*, it becomes the characteristic feature of what Richard Rorty spoke of as "the linguistic turn" – including both logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy. These various ideas about the significance of logic and language to philosophy virtually disappear in late analytic philosophy; and this change goes with the resurgence in late analytic philosophy of metaphysics. From Wittgenstein's early philosophy through middle analytic philosophy, the conception of philosophy as concerned with logic and language went with a profoundly critical attitude to metaphysics, which began to change only in 1959, with the publication of Strawson's *Individuals*. Late analytic philosophy is in some ways closer to ideas in Russell's thinking; he wanted to improve metaphysics not to consign it to the flames.

2) Late analytic philosophy has carried much further than middle analytic philosophy the professionalization of philosophy and (along with that) its specialization. It's useful to note here three very different philosophers of the mainstream of middle analytic philosophy: Paul Grice, Bernard Williams and Elizabeth Anscombe. All three had extensive backgrounds in the history of philosophy and had philosophical interests that did not fall into any narrow category. Grice, for example, was known to have explicitly rejected

the compartmentalization of philosophy. But the culture of philosophy now makes their kind of approach extremely difficult. The mainstream of late analytic philosophy is also distinguished by the prevalent conceptions of the way philosophy is related to the empirical sciences. It may be seen as continuous with the empirical sciences or as itself able to draw on scientific work and to make use of the methods of the empirical sciences. The shift here, away from the middle-analytic understanding of the relation between science and philosophy, reflects to a considerable degree the influence of Quine. Within mainstream late analytic philosophy, the prevalent conception of philosophical methodology is that there are here two possibilities: an armchair approach drawing on supposed "intuitions", or an approach continuous with the empirical sciences. What goes missing is any idea that philosophical methodology might involve attention to experience but not in the kinds of way characteristic of empirical science. I would instance here David Wiggins (whom I take to be a middleanalytic philosopher) and his advice to the readers of his *Ethics*: that they "draw constantly upon [their] lived experience in the world, enlarging that experience by imaginative reference to some larger stretch of human history and human discourse". Here there is a drawing on experience which is not modelled on the sciences.

3) What I take to be problematic in late analytic philosophy is the general attitude to the forms of responsive philosophy that characterized much of early and middle analytic philosophy. A "responsive philosopher", as I use the term, is someone who sees thought as having gone wrong in some significant way, and who responds to that going-wrong of our thinking. Thus Berkeley's *Three Dialogues* express responsive philosophy: Hylas is someone who is being led wrong by contemporary strands of thought (especially materialism), and Philonous's philosophy is directed to leading him back from these wrong paths. Responsive philosophy was important for much of early and middle analytic philosophy. An excellent example would be Philippa Foot's account of what leads us down a misleading path towards consequentialism. Within late analytic philosophy, there is considerable hostility to the kind of responsive philosophy that characterized the earlier and middle periods. That sort of philosophy is seen as disdaining to answer serious philosophical problems, and in particular disdaining to answer metaphysical questions, and as dismissive of such problems. At the heart of much responsive philosophy is the idea that we don't fully see what we are doing in asking philosophical questions – what assumptions we are making and what misunderstandings we may unwittingly be relying on. But the responsive philosopher's insistence on querying the questions can be seen as a kind of quietism that simply ignores real questions. Within the professionalization of analytic philosophy, problems define areas

of expertise and fields of research; and problematizing the problems is not the way to make progress. Hence there is a kind of hostility towards responsive philosophy that runs through much contemporary analytic philosophy.

Hans-Johann Glock
Universität Zürich

1) There is one striking similarity between the dawn of analytic philosophy, epitomized by Moore, Russell, the early Wittgenstein and the logical positivists on the one hand, and recent analytic philosophy on the other. It is the preoccupation with methodological issues, issues that, following Witgenstein's eccentric pupil Lazerowitz, we nowadays call "metaphilosophical". Reflections on the nature, scope and limits of philosophy were key to the formation of the new analytic current, with its turn from epistemology and metaphysics to logic and the philosophy of language. After World War II this interest waned and metaphilosophical reflections were often decried as an unfruitful form of navel-gazing. Over the last 40 years they have been rehabilitated, and for very good reasons. The analytic movement has turned into a well-entrenched mainstream. At the same time it has become extremely diverse and frayed, not least because some of the earlier methodological views, notably the linguistic turn, have fallen out of favour. This special issue bears witness to one fallout from this development, namely the rise of the history of analytic philosophy as a distinct and flourishing sub-discipline. The unsurveyability of the current scene creates a need for clarity about the paths leading us there; and the feeling that analytic philosophy is dying on its feet as a distinct movement fuels a kind of "Owl of Minerva" syndrome. Another, connected, fallout is the resurgence of interest in metaphilosophy. Analytic philosophy was never united by doctrines of even the most general kind. Nevertheless there were certain widely accepted ideas about some central tasks of philosophy and how to tackle them. Among them were the need to clarify questions and terminology for propaedeutic purposes and the need for argument without appeal to authority (whether to sacred texts or the alleged discoveries of fashionable empirical disciplines). But since the 1980s even this minimalist consensus has vanished. The result has been a passionate struggle over the heart and soul of analytic philosophy, which includes the question of whether the latter should give way to a "post-analytic" philosophy that has been promoted in the wake of Rorty. Even among those who still pay allegiance to analytic philosophy, the most basic methodological convictions are hotly contested. There is a debate between three identifiable (though not precisely demarcated) camps: diehard natural-

ists, keen to turn philosophy into a continuation of natural science in the spirit of Quine; defenders of a priori metaphysics, more or less strongly influenced by the idea of possible worlds forcefully developed by Kripke and Lewis; and those who try to rehabilitate diverse forms of conceptual analysis, sometimes inspired by classical conceptual analysis à la Wittgenstein and Ryle (e.g. Hacker and Horwich), sometimes seeking to integrate naturalist and essentialist ideas (e.g. Jackson and Chalmers), and sometimes belonging to a broadly pragmatist tradition (e.g. Putnam and Blackburn). More recent additions to this titanic struggle include the debate over what role, if any, appeal to intuitions should play in philosophy and whether the aspiration of rational philosophical debate is undermined by the phenomenon of "peer disagreement".

2) Speaking as a relative outsider, practical philosophy in the analytic tradition has recently been shaped by a revival of work on meta-ethical issues, widely conceived. These range from the renaissance of ethical particularism (i.e. intuitionism) through the continuing controversy over the tenability of neo-expressivism to the debate about the nature of moral disagreement. Political philosophy has finally overcome its obsession with fighting over the true mantle of liberalism, and especially of Rawls. It may also be closer to political theory and actual politics and economics, partly because of a renewed debate about the merits of democracy, partly because of the continuing spread of novel variants of decision theory. This last development is part and parcel of a neo-positivist trend that is also evident in theoretical philosophy. It is the ambitious project of a "mathematical philosophy" (as practiced e.g. at the Munich Centre of Mathematical Philosophy), which rekindles hopes for a definitive solution of philosophical problems through the development and employment of ever more sophisticated formal tools promising terminological, methodological and doctrinal rigour. In both moral and political philosophy, finally, the important connections to the theory of action as pioneered by Anscombe and Davidson have been explored (e.g. in the work of Raz). A central bone of contention in this area has recently been the nature of reasons and of explanations that refer to reasons or reasoning. The topics of actions and reasons (for belief, speech and action) also form a crucial link to theoretical philosophy, where they play a role in epistemology, philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind.

In theoretical philosophy the aforementioned three metaphilosophical stances – naturalism, a priori metaphysics and conceptual analysis – also mark main currents within first-order philosophizing in contemporary analytic philosophy. This holds in particular for physicalist endeavours which try to show that non-natural "higher" phenomena are either unreal (eliminativism), or that, correctly understood, they are really nothing over and above certain

physical phenomena (reductionism). As regards their respective importance, this varies from one geographical area to another, and also depending on whether one is concerned with academic philosophy, the wider academic community, or the educated public at large. Concerning academic philosophy, conceptual analysis remains most prominent in the old strongholds of classic conceptual analysis, notably Britain. But it also has followers in continental Europe, though many of them would prefer to regard themselves as descriptive metaphysicians in the spirit of Strawson (e.g. Künne). Conceptual analysis is a minority movement, however. Its impact on other university disciplines is dwarfed by that of naturalism, except perhaps for jurisprudence, which has always had a natural affinity to conceptual clarification and engineering. As regards the majority of university departments in North America, it may be a close race between possible world semantics and metaphysics on the one hand, and diverse branches of naturalism on the other. When it comes to the impact on other academic disciplines, however, naturalism wins hands down. The most striking case in point is the cognitive sciences. Their main philosophical influences, such as they are, derive from more or less strident naturalists such as Fodor, Dennett and Searle. One remarkable recent development in this area is the rise of the "philosophy of animal minds" as a distinct subdiscipline; it is situated between cognitive ethology, mainstream philosophy of mind and a rejuvenated philosophical anthropology.

In some central fields of theoretical philosophy, notably the philosophy of mind and language, there is a Homeric struggle between naturalists and neopragmatists. In the wake of Wittgenstein and Kripke, the latter have contended, for instance, that thought and language involve rules that defy capture by natural science. In line with the more general script summarized above, naturalists have reacted to this "normativist" challenge in either the eliminativist vein, by denying that norms are essential to content and meaning after all, or through reductionist programmes purporting to capture normative force in purely naturalist terms. An especially popular and forceful variant of this second course is the teleosemantics of Millikan and Neander.

3) At the same time there remain areas in which naturalism and pragmatism in a loose sense seem to go hand in hand, such as the continuing attempts to analyse linguistic meaning and propositional content along Gricean lines (e.g. Schiffer). Analytic philosophy is not just the most important contemporary philosophical movement in institutional and numerical terms. It also furnishes a point of orientation for the others. But there are continuous rumours about the "demise" of analytic philosophy, about it being "defunct" or at least in "crisis", and complaints about its "widely perceived ills". A sense of crisis is

palpable not just among commentators but also among some leading protagonists. Von Wright noted that in the course of graduating from a revolutionary movement into the philosophical establishment, analytic philosophy has also become so diverse as to lose its distinctive profile. This view is echoed by countless observers who believe that the customary distinction between analytic and continental philosophy has become obsolete. Loss of identity is one general worry; loss of vigour another. Analytic philosophers have by and large abandoned earlier promises of providing definitive solutions or dissolutions of all philosophical problems, or of furnishing canonical methods that would guarantee philosophical progress. Worse still, the scholastic, factionalist, dogmatic and exclusionary tendencies of contemporary analytic philosophy show that we are past the heroic age of analytic philosophy. To borrow a distinction from the history of architecture, there is a real danger that analytic philosophy has exhausted its capacity for structural progress, and is capable of progressing only with respect to the embellishments.

In such a constellation, analytic philosophy's novel interest in its own history and its renewed methodological self-examination – emphasized in my answer to question (1) – are welcome and timely. The unexamined philosophical practice is not worth pursuing. Unfortunately, radical metaphilosophical disagreements have sometimes led to counterproductive acrimony and partisanship. But modesty before our great and important subject demands that all parties pay heed to the difference between philosophy well done and philosophy that chimes with our own philosophical and meta-philosophical views.

This provides a cue for picking up one last loose thread from my answer to question (2). Before considering which current of recent analytic philosophy has been most important to the cultural and political world at large, it behoves us to note and deplore the fact that the wider impact of analytic philosophy has been negligible, even compared to that of other philosophical currents such as post-modernism. There are, however, signs that this may be about to change. We are undergoing a period dominated by right-wing populism, with brazen attacks on science and rational thought, ideologically fuelled by "post-truth" inanities. This has awoken many analytic philosophers, including practitioners of theoretical philosophy, from their ivory-tower slumbers. One must hope that this very recent trend will mature into a current that future historians of analytic philosophy will be able to record with pride.

Matthew Haug
The College of William & Mary, Williamsburg

1) Within the last thirty years or so, the history of early analytic philosophy has emerged as a distinct subfield of analytic philosophy. Work in this subfield has shown that the philosophical landscape during the early analytic period was more complicated and variegated than it was often claimed to be during the middle decades of the twentieth century. This increased historical sophistication is itself an important new development in the analytic tradition. Some may argue that fully appreciating this development should make one wary of providing any other answer to this question. On this view, it is a mistake to try to identify overarching themes or commitments in early analytic philosophy that could be contrasted with those from late analytic philosophy. Attempting to do so can only distort our understanding of both the history of the analytic tradition and the philosophical issues with which it has been concerned: better to take a more fine-grained, piecemeal approach to particular historical figures and debates.

Although there is much to be said in favor of this idea, even caricatures have their uses. For instance, it is not too misleading to claim that much important work during the early analytic period was focused on language and logic and that many projects in early analytic philosophy were based on the analysis of the meaning of linguistic terms and on accounts of how that meaning is determined and immediately available to users of those terms.

Two developments that helped to usher in late analytic philosophy raised serious questions about whether such projects were feasible. First, work on reference in the 1970s by Hilary Putnam, Saul Kripke, and others called into question whether the meaning of many terms is immediately accessible to users of those terms. Second, W.V.O. Quine's critical engagement with logical empiricism offered an alternative approach to philosophy that rejected a cluster of distinctions (analytic/synthetic, practical/theoretical, external/internal) that was central to much linguistically-oriented early analytic philosophy. These two lines of thought contributed to a resurgence of interest in metaphysical issues that has been a major current in mainstream late analytic philosophy for roughly three decades (and to which I return in response to the next question).

Regarding similarities, early and late analytic philosophy tend to share a respect for the methods and results of the sciences (including those of logic and mathematics). In both periods, philosophers differ on how this respect should be expressed. Some hold that the proper application of scientific methods will deliver substantive answers to traditional philosophical questions, while others believe that applying these methods will show that such questions are misguided and call for dissolution rather than straightforward resolution. This

issue will come up again in my response to the last question.

2) I will focus on two strong methodological currents in late analytic philosophy that loosely correspond to the two key developments that I identified in my response to the first question. The first methodological current is related to Quine's rejection of the importance of the analytic/synthetic distinction and to the holistic account of theory confirmation that he adopts in its place. On this view, scientific theories should be evaluated with respect to global virtues such as simplicity, theoretical fecundity, and how well they are integrated with other well-supported theories, and, it claims, philosophical theories should be evaluated in the same way. For example, as Quine puts it, ontological questions are "on a par" with questions of natural science. In this way, metaphysical and other philosophical issues are allegedly naturalized, by being shown to be amenable to the same methods that scientists are thought to use to choose between competing theories.

According to the second current, agreement with our firmly held, ordinary or commonsense judgments is among the theoretical virtues that should be used to evaluate philosophical theories. Further, these judgments are taken to be revealed by our pre-theoretic, "intuitive" responses to possible cases. This component is related to Putnam's and Kripke's work on reference in that their main support for their claims about reference relied on what they took to be widely shared intuitions about what proper names and natural kind terms refer to in counterfactual situations.

I am not sure that these currents are so strong that they deserve to be called "the mainstream" in late analytic philosophy as a whole. However, the first current has been identified as the methodology of "mainstream analytic metaphysics", and the second current is present not only there but also in many other subfields of philosophy, where it intersects with the widely sought goal of achieving reflective equilibrium between general philosophical principles and judgments about individual cases.

Maintaining agreement with our ordinary, "intuitive" judgments may pull against the other theoretical virtues, as even a passing familiarity with contemporary physics strongly suggests. Philosophers who still want to swim in both currents may try to quell this potential turbulence by pointing out that there are tradeoffs between theoretical virtues and that there may be good reason to give less weight to agreement with intuition than to the other virtues. Others may see a deeper conflict here and suggest that we would do better to escape the second current altogether and give no evidential weight to intuitions. I touch on this important dispute in my next response.

3) The two methodological currents discussed above have been subject to criticism from several different directions. In my view, these two sets of controversies are among the most important and interesting debates in contemporary philosophy. In the broadest terms, they concern the place of philosophy in the larger intellectual landscape. Resolving them would go a long way toward determining not only the goals that philosophy can hope to achieve but also the methods that it should adopt to achieve them.

The neo-Quinean, realist approach to ontological questions has been challenged by philosophers who urge a more deflationary point of view, often by developing elements of earlier attacks on metaphysics, such as, for example, Carnap's idea that metaphysical questions admit of "internal" and "external" readings or the global anti-theoretical perspective found in Wittgenstein's later work. Other criticisms of neo-Quinean metaphysics are potentially less sweeping. For example, some have suggested that metaphysical questions should be pursued only to the extent that they contribute to solving problems of broad societal concern. Others have claimed that analytic metaphysics fails to engage with the results of our best current science and instead relies on a superficial or outmoded picture of the world, resulting in so-called solutions to problems that are poorly motivated from the start.

The fact that many of these positions are labeled by a term that begins with 'neo' – neo-Carnapian, neo-Wittgensteinian, neo-positivist, neo-pragmatist, etc. – shows that many contemporary positions are strongly influenced by work from early and middle period analytic philosophy. However, recent work on these issues has not just rehashed old debates but has significantly clarified what is at stake in them and how they might be resolved.

Critical discussion of the second current – the use of intuitions as evidence for philosophical theories – has been catalyzed by work in experimental philosophy, which seeks to apply empirical methods (especially those of social psychology) to address philosophical questions. Experimental philosophy is by no means monolithic, but one of its prominent sub-movements argues that appealing to intuitions in philosophy is illegitimate since subjects' intuitive responses have supposedly been shown to be determined by factors that are irrelevant to the philosophical issues at hand (factors such as the order in which cases are presented or the culture in which a subject grew up).

This critique has inspired a number of responses, both from those who seek to rebut it directly and from those who claim that it is off the mark since, in their view, philosophers typically do not rely on intuitions as evidence in the first place. More generally, these debates have contributed to efforts to get clearer about just what intuitions are and about what kinds of capacities are responsible for their production.

Cheryl Misak
University of Toronto

1) It's very difficult these days to get a grip on just what "analytic philosophy" is. One might think, then, that the difference between early analytic philosophy and late analytic philosophy is that we knew what we were talking about when we employed the phrase in, say, the 1920s and we don't know what we're talking about now. But even that isn't clear. Three overlapping attempts at defining analytic philosophy spring immediately to my mind, but each quickly disintegrates, even in the early days.

a. Conceptual analysis. It used to be that there was a distinct methodology that travelled under the banner "analytic philosophy": the attempt to provide analytic definitions, or necessary and sufficient conditions, for our concepts. But even in the heyday of analytic definition, we had some recognizably analytic philosophers pushing back on the idea that we could provide such definitions. Was G.E. Moore not an analytic philosopher because he thought that some of our central philosophical concepts are indefinable? Was F.P. Ramsey not an analytic philosopher because he thought that definition was of limited value?

b. Reductionism. Sometimes "analytic philosophy" is used as a label for any attempt to reduce a category A to a more fundamental category B – for instance, to reduce the meaningful to what can be stated in the terms of observation and formal logic; to reduce belief to behaviour; and so on. But again, even in the heyday of reductionism, there were recognizably analytic philosophers who pushed against this kind of project. When the logical positivists gave up on the strong programme of reduction, did they cease to be analytic philosophers?

c. Philosophy as Formal Logic. It may be thought that early analytic philosophy was driven by the new formal logic developed by Frege and Russell. But in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein said, and meant, that what *cannot* be expressed in the primary or logical language is more important than what *can* be expressed there. Does that mean that the *Tractatus* is not a work in analytic philosophy?

Even if one of these definitions of analytic philosophy is thought to not admit of counterexamples – that Moore, for instance, was a logical analyst who simply thought that not all concepts could be defined – surely it is still the case that the history of analytic philosophy includes all three of these ways of doing philosophy, and more. It also includes, I have argued, the brand of empiricism called pragmatism. To say that the history of analytic philosophy doesn't include great logicians C.S. Peirce or C.I. Lewis because they argued

that there was more to analyzing a concept than offering a definition, or that they argued against reductionist projects or against the fact-value dichotomy, would be very strange indeed.

2) Since I think that analytic philosophy is a broad church, I would be loathe to try to identify a mainstream. I think such an attempt would be misguided. Even if one could identify a sociological trend amongst analytic philosophers, I would expect that so-called mainstream to be a changing, evolving thing.

I suppose I could say that a similar core runs through both early and contemporary analytic philosophy: a methodology that seeks to scrutinize our deepest conceptions and convictions and offer a coherent account of them, based on careful argument. Not very exciting, but sometimes the truth is like that.

3) I suppose the very nature of this volume suggests that one controversial aspect of current analytic philosophy is to say whether it is broad or narrow. It will be clear on which side of the controversy I stand. Given that I take analytic philosophy to be a broad church, concerned with the most important issues that face us, it will be unsurprising that I think that some of the more vital issues of current analytic philosophy have to do with the nature of truth, the evaluation of belief, and whether disputed beliefs such as ethical, political, counterfactual, and general beliefs are truth apt. Philosophy, William James said, "is at once the most sublime and the most trivial of human pursuits. It works in the minutest crannies and it opens out the widest vistas". Surely analytic philosophy can and must do both.

Philip Pettit
Princeton University

1) Early analytic philosophy began from a strange theory of meaning, evident in the work of G.E.Moore and Bertrand Russell up to about 1905, when Russell published the theory of descriptions. This theory assumed that every word had a corresponding meaning, often described as a concept, and led Russell even to wonder what meaning – by assumption, what atomic meaning – the definite article had. On that picture, analysis was only appropriate with compound terms, which were taken to be analyzable into simple, unanalyzable terms. This atomistic view began to break down with the theory of descriptions but remained fundamentally in place until about 1930, appearing in a distinctive form in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* of 1922.

The work of the later Wittgenstein and of the Oxford School of Ordinary

Philosophy recast the task of conceptual analysis, arguing for a greater sensitivity to what made sense in ordinary locutions and an awareness of the possibility that philosophizing often broke the ordinary rules and ended up making little sense. This development was severely inhibited by Grice's development of the distinction between semantic incoherence and pragmatic infelicity. It may be infelicitous in ordinary usage to say that I know I have a pain but it is hardly incoherent, as had been claimed, and hardly involves a deep misunderstanding of the notion of knowledge.

Logical positivism, which had developed independently in Austria and Germany, had little truck with ordinary language philosophy, arguing instead for a strict ruling on what should count as meaningful sentences and distinguishing those into sentences true by meaning and empirically true. While Willard Quine cast doubt on the possibility of making the latter distinction, it was reinstated in a new, clearer form by David Lewis's work on convention which effectively associated terms with conventionally established assumptions. And while Saul Kripke undermined the idea that reference is always fixed by narrow assumptions about the referent – by meaning in a sense expressed in those assumptions – Lewis and Frank Jackson made room for Kripke's insights by allowing that the assumptions may sometimes rigidly identify the referent: on this account the referent of 'water' is not whatever fits established assumptions about water but the actual stuff that does so.

Building on this work, Lewis inaugurated the program of vindicating the problematic terms of ordinary language, say in mental vocabulary, by identifying a way of defining them, or at least near relatives, in functional terms. The entities that deserved to be designated or ascribed by use of those terms would be defined, often defined in a holistic or package deal, by the causal or other roles they play, with those roles being described in less problematic vocabulary. Thus, the state of believing that p would be identified as the state that played the role of being responsive to evidence that p or not p, that led the agent to act for desire-satisfaction as if it were the case that p, and so on.

This sketchy history underlines one continuity between late and early twentieth century philosophy: beginning from language in giving an account of how the world is and what it is about various properties and other entities that makes them deservers of the terms in which we ascribe or posit them. But the differences are also salient. For in the functionalist picture of at least much of philosophy there is a concern to give an account of those deservers, at least in problematic vocabularies such as the language of mind and morality, that locates them within a naturalistically or scientifically intelligible universe.

2) I think of the functionalist paradigm of conceptual analysis as still fitted to be cast as the orthodoxy in late analytic philosophy. But it has come under attack on a number of fronts, generating alternative approaches.

It is central to the paradigm that all the terms in our folk psychology of the mind can be defined after a functional pattern in other simpler terms and this is often used to vindicate a physicalism about the mind of the kind originally put forward by Jack Smart and David Armstrong. But one line of attack on this approach has been to argue that various mental concepts, in particular those associated with consciousness, defy functional analysis. This has led to theories of the mind in which physicalism is rejected or at least understood in a very different manner from that associated with the functionalist variety. Those theories have pressed people into arguing for different models of how problematic terms gain their meaning, yielding a different picture of what conceptual analysis involves.

Lewis recognized that the functionalist analysis of a term may sometimes leave it open whether the term designates one or another entity or whether it predicates one or another property. Although this is now disputed, he appears to have suggested that among the candidates for the semantic value of such a term, some may be more natural than others, where naturalness comes in degrees and tends to be understood on an intuitive basis. And, so this reading of his intentions goes, he proposed that the term should be taken to refer to the most natural candidate. This has led many thinkers to recast the role of basic philosophy altogether, presenting it as an attempt to limn the boundaries of the natural in this sense, looking for what purportedly are the joints at which reality in itself is carved, not at the presumptively conventional distinctions that we introduce there in service of our own interests.

This last development has been buttressed by a novel twist introduced under the influence, mainly, of Kit Fine. Lewis and others had argued that a functional analysis of "belief" or "desire" or any such problematic, quasi-theoretical term showed how a physical state might play the role ascribed and deserve to be named by the term. And on this picture, that meant that the facts described in mental terms were "supervenient" on the physical facts, in the sense that they could not vary without a variation at the physical level. In such a case the physical and mental facts not only satisfy the formal condition defined as supervenience; plausibly, the physical facts ground the mental facts, as it is not often put, where grounding is a substantive relation *in rebus*, not something that lends itself to full analysis. Since grounding involves a real relationship in the world, that has supported the idea that basic philosophy has the substantive aim of identifying the grounding relationships in things, a task that is distinct from any form of conceptual analysis.

3) I am one of those who hankers still for the methodological clarity of the functionalist program, whether pursued in thinking about the law and the state, about moral value, free will and responsibility, or about causation and personhood. I do not see how philosophy can claim to be positioned to explore the world except via an exploration and critique of the assumptions about the world that are built into our ways of speaking and thinking, whether in commonsense or in science. And I believe that the main challenge in metaphysics and related areas is still that of looking for how far commonsense assumptions can be squared with those that science supports: how far the manifest image, as Wilfrid Sellars put it, can be squared with the scientific image. But I am interested, particularly, in exploring new ways of approaching the goal held up in such analysis.

One insight that is important by my lights, and has been pushed recently by David Plunkett and others, is that ordinary language is often so context-sensitive that it allows us to construct a number of candidate concepts or representations that answer equally well to its connotations. The task this multiplicity of concepts then gives us is that of choosing the best candidate for whatever are our purposes in philosophy; these would certainly include the aim of reconciling the manifest and scientific images. Thus, while I distinguish between different concepts of freedom that are each more or less faithful to ordinary usage, I hold that one of these (freedom as non-domination rather than freedom as non-interference) can help to build a more satisfactory normative theory of government; it can better satisfy John Rawls's test of reflective equilibrium.

Another insight that has influenced my own work recently is that many of the more exciting ventures in analytic philosophy have involved, not looking case by case for the assumptions that appear to be linked with the use of one or another problematic term or concept, but constructing a narrative in which the protagonists come in plausible, unproblematic stages to give currency to a term or concept that, on reflection, looks to be equivalent to ours. Arguably, H.L.A. Hart tries to do that for the concept of law, for example, David Lewis for the concept of convention, Edward Craig for the concept of knowledge, Bernard Williams for the concept of truth. In a forthcoming book, *The Birth of Ethics*, I try out this methodology for a raft of ethical concepts; the book looks at a way in which a pre-moral community might come in plausible, naturalistic steps to give currency to concepts that answer intuitively to our various moral concepts.

Nicholas Rescher
University of Pittsburgh

(1) How does the early analytic philosophy – say that of the 1920-1940 era of Russell, Moore, Ayer, Charles Stevenson, and C.I. Lewis – differ from that of its more recent version in the 1970-2020 era of Putnam, Quine, Kripke, David Lewis and their progeny in the next generation?

The following points are prominent among the contrasts to be noted here:

- The earlier analysts contemplated a program of philosophical reductionism. They deployed the tools of analysis to undermine or even eliminate various traditional philosophical projects. For example, they were opposed to mere (Meinongian) possibilia, to nonexistent objects, to the bare speculation of thought experiments. In all these regards the later analysts became increasingly open-minded and accepting, prepared not only to retail but even broaden the philosophical agenda in both thematic and methodological regards.
- Moreover, the earlier analysts were dedicated to the reality and facticity of what is and had little or no patience for the normativity of what ought to be. They deemed matters of value, worth priority, and the like as beyond the reach of rigorous philosophical inquiry. Here too their successors took a very different line.
- The earlier analysts were given to broad and sweeping generalizations, inclined to think that what holds for one item of a certain salient sort is typical and apt to hold for all. For example, Russell's theory of descriptions that what holds good for one fictional item "the present king of France" will hold for nonexistents at large. The later analysts, by contrast, were inclined to descend into detailed particularities. They exhibited a vastly greater concern for analytical microdetail and manifested a corresponding reluctance to embrace far-reaching generalizations.
- Such reluctance to see the detail of cases as generally typical enmeshed the later analysts with a greater concern for detail and distinctions. Their proceeding became a venture in conceptual microscopy. And this in turn led them into the increasing complexity of division of labor and its consequent specialization.
- The earlier analysts wanted to surpass philosophical history: they generally regarded earlier philosophizing as based on outdated and untenable commitments. The later analysts sought to turn analytical methods upon historical materials in a search for instructive lessons. Analytically inspired historiography has become a gold-mine for latter-day philosophizing.

In all these regards, the later analysts radically transformed the philosophical landscape envisioned by their earlier compeers.

(2) Issues of philosophical history apart, two thematic features mainly separate early from later analytic philosophy, namely possibility and normativity.

Unlike the early analysts who focused devotedly on actuality, factuality, and reality, the later analysts increasingly emphasized matters of possibility, hypothesis, and nonexistent but possible worlds. Here these figures in logic, in metaphysics, and in theoretical and practical philosophy now became focal issues.

And this brought another realm of concern into the forefront, namely value theory and practical philosophy. Reality is simply what it is, but probability carries comparative assessment and evaluation in its wake, both cognitively (in point of comparative probability) and evaluatively (in point of comparative merit).

For the earlier analysts science – the investigation of the actual world and the investigation of the domain of fact – was paradigmatic. But the later analysts turned increasingly to speculation and thought experimentation – the investigation of "what would we say if" – became an increasingly paramount concern of philosophical inquiry.

With norms, evaluations, and criteria in the forefront, the rational basis of discourse and inquiry came to be seen as an increasingly pressing topic. While with practical matters factual observation provides the ultimate ground of validation, with speculation matters we will need to launch in other directions. The topic of consistency and the epistemology of plausibility will become the pivotal issues.

In the later phase of analytic philosophizing the doors were thus thrown wide open to the prospect of new areas of concern. Not just the cognitive sphere of knowledge and its limits but the issues of ethical judgment and social policy (justice, fairness) came to figure on the agenda, with matters of justice, fairness, equality, and the like now at the forefront. Even the rationality of religious belief came on the scene and analytical philosophy of religion was a thriving concern rather than a contradiction in terms.

(3) The prime difference between early and late analytic philosophy is the product of increasing specialization and fragmentation that has resulted from the growth of the philosophical profession. The resultant technicalization of investigations has transformed philosophy into an aggregation of specialties and of specialists given to investigating minute issues in highly technical ways. The increasing remoteness from philosophy's formulative starting-point concerns was doubtless something that its pioneers would not have appreciated.

The use of far-fetched thought experiments and wild hypothesis is a particular questionable aspect of latter day analytic philosophy. For the philosopher's "clarifications" by the use of extreme cases and fanciful science-fiction examples engender pressures that burst the bonds holding our concepts together, seeing that the concepts we standardly employ are geared to an implicit view of the nature of the real and that to press our philosophical concepts beyond the limits of the realities that make them viable does not conduce to clarification but leads ad absurdum. A striking consequence of this situation is that on its basis the entire bizarre demonology of much contemporary philosophy can be averted. We no longer have to worry about cross-wired brains that share the same thoughts (or don't they?) or shrewd aliens from outer space that can inspect our visual fields (will they "see the same things" even though their concepts are different?).

Then too, the technicalization of the discipline has been accompanied by a striking lack of self-criticism and self-awareness at large. While the philosophical landscape is nowadays replete with philosophy-of-this and philosophical-of-that (of science, of law, of feminism, of spirit, etc.), the philosophy of philosophy is a decidedly under-exposed terrain. Self-criticism is something present day analytical philosophers lack. Unlike these earlier confreres who thought that philosophy had the mission of unmasking error and mistaken demonstration, present day analytic philosophers are remarkably reluctant to explain why what they are doing is significantly useful and important.

On the other hand, the shift from early to late analytic philosophy has had some very substantial benefits. For broadening of the agenda not only led to the recovery of many of the interesting traditional preoccupations of philosophers, but has also witnessed an opening of horizons of concern and a remarkably broadening of perspective. For example, the analytic philosophy of religion represents a remarkable recovery of prior abandonments, and the philosophy of science has seen a flourishing of expertise that has transmuted its status as a critic of science into an appreciated collaborator of its practitioners

In conclusion, it deserves comment that the very flourishing of analytic philosophizing has itself created a substantial structural gap with which the field had been unwilling or unable to deal. The proliferation of increasingly small scale studies by means of increasingly technical thought instrumentalities has created the need for works of syntheses and integration to give an account of the bigger picture providing some idea of what useful lessons emerge from the mass of inconsistencies. The near-total absence of those much-needed works of synthesis and integration is a deficit that is a disgrace to the discipline. And this situation is unlikely to be remedied as long as graduate schools train philosophical fledglings to see it as their mission to plant more trees without bothering about the forest.

John Skorupski
University of St. Andrews

1) "Early" analytic philosophy (in the present sense) can be thought of in three phases. There is the work of such figures as Moore, Russell, and Wittgenstein up to the end of the first world war. There is Wittgenstein's "middle period" and the work of the Vienna Circle to around the second world war. The final and longest phase then stretches through to the 1970s or so: it includes Wittgenstein's "late period" and the various forms of ordinary language philosophy. I would also include here work in Harvard by Putnam and Quine, and the work on meaning of such writers as Davidson and Dummett, where the assumption is still that the theory of meaning is the basic philosophical discipline.

The development of analytic philosophy throughout these years, though undoubtedly a very varied story, is a thematically continuous one. Internal debates, often intense, actually contributed to the thematic continuity. Taking the three phases together, one can speak of an analytic *tradition*. The idea that philosophical problems can and should be dissolved by analysis of language was central, though not uncontested. When historians of philosophy look back on the twentieth century the analytic tradition, in all its variety, will probably be their main focus of interest, or at any rate at least on a par with phenomenology and existentialism.

Now, in "late analytic philosophy" there is a widely shared rejection of this tradition. Indeed, rejection of its fundamental theses about philosophy and language are about the only thing the diverse strands of late analytic philosophy can agree on. Philosophical questions, specifically, metaphysical questions, are, it is now generally held, genuine questions. How they relate to science is debated. But (it is thought) they certainly cannot be dissolved by linguistic analysis.

How did this striking turn happen? Clearly a pivotal element was the work of Quine. His debate with Carnap on truth and convention, his assaults on analyticity, synonymy, and modality, his thesis of the indeterminacy of translation, his holistic verificationism, his minimalism about truth – all of these belong with the analytic tradition. And yet they were important in ending it, because they undermined the tradition's central claims about meaning, from within. However – perhaps for this reason – since Quine's critique has done its work it has taken a back seat. Instead, new impulses to metaphysics have come from Saul Kripke, David Lewis and "possible-world semantics". To some extent independently, a traditionally realist and intuitionist understanding of necessity and aprioricity has been revived. However another element in Quine's philosophical approach has strongly lasted: his naturalism. This is a "thesis" which in the period of the analytic tradition could only have been seen as an

old-fashioned, probably vacuous, bit of nineteenth century pseudo-science. Its status is very different now. The combination of metaphysical realism and naturalism is one of the most influential standpoints in "late analytic philosophy".

2) Given that the central, even defining, tenets of the analytic tradition have lapsed I question whether it is useful to call this period "analytic philosophy" at all – at least in a thematic as against a primarily institutional sense. If the term 'analytic philosophy' refers to anything now, it is to a style of writing, a professional familiarity with and liking for some formal techniques, and a set of university philosophy departments in which the use of such techniques is well accepted. 'Analytical philosophy' in this institutional sense refers to a distinctive social praxis in academe. It is not defined thematically by any main stream, and increasingly, it does not have one. It is in this sense that we can understand such labels as "analytic" Marxism, or "analytic" Thomism. (I should mention at this point that I cannot here discuss developments in moral and political philosophy, important as they have been. With the exception of meta-ethics, they do not fit into the historical framework we are considering, and must be discussed independently.)

The academic aspects of philosophy are of course affected by the institutional development of universities, where philosophy is nowadays almost exclusively pursued. In terms of sheer numbers of researchers, philosophical activity is much bigger now, and that in itself makes a difference. Ever more philosophy academics are writing ever more papers, and chasing ever larger grants of money. The effect, if any, on the content of philosophy is not yet clear. On the one hand, it is reasonable to worry that interactions between intellectual fashion and grant-giving may discourage genuine as against artificial philosophical innovation, and discourage large ambitions. On the other hand, bureaucratic funding systems usually have attempts at diversity and neutrality built into them. In any case genuine philosophical innovation has always been the preserve of a strong-minded few, and such people can probably flourish irrespective of this or that system of academic research incentives.

3) While philosophy has greatly diversified, I noted that rejection of the analytical tradition has been accompanied by a widespread return to the combination of naturalism and realism.

This important shift stands out clearly if we view it in a longer historical perspective. Important strands in nineteenth century philosophy adopted the same standpoint. In logic, epistemology, ethics, they sought philosophical illumination from empirical psychology and human evolutionary biology. Important trends today (e.g. "experimental philosophy") once again take this line.

In due course Frege reacted against psychologism – by extension against all forms of naturalistic reduction – in logic, while Sidgwick and Moore reacted against naturalistic reduction in ethics. Sidgwick and Moore were committed to the synthetic a priori status of ethics; as I have discussed elsewhere, Frege accepted a broad notion of analyticity which effectively raises the same epistemological questions. However none of them was very forthcoming about answers.

The analytic tradition went further; it sought to answer them. I agree with historians of the analytic tradition who see the analytic tradition, notably in its second and third phase, as a version of "Critical" philosophy, in the sense in which that term was used by Kant. Like Kant, it rejected a conception of philosophy as the broadest science of reality. Kant called this conception "transcendental realism", and famously thought it had to be rejected if "empirical realism" was to be preserved. In the analytic tradition we see a similar dialectic. But where Kant's doctrine of the a priori turned on forms of sensibility and categories of the understanding, in the analytic tradition something else did the work. In broad terms it was an epistemic, or "use", conception of meaning. Its final stages in the analytic tradition appeared in Michael Dummett's notion of anti-realism, and in Hilary Punam's distinction between metaphysical and empirical realism.

It is virtually definitive of Critical philosophy to reject the combination of naturalism and metaphysical realism – the very combination which again dominates (and which is one of the things people have in mind when they criticise "scientism".) Yet the criticisms by Quine, and others, of the analytic tradition's basic idea, that of grounding the a priori on a theory of meaning, were sound. It seems then that neither transcendental idealism nor the analytic tradition's appeal to meaning provided a stable platform for the Critical standpoint.

Does that mean rejecting the Critical approach itself? Or is that throwing away the baby with the bath water? It is one thing to reject metaphysical realism (in effect, that is, a correspondence conception of truth), quite another to endorse some epistemic conception of meaning. We should leave meaning to the semanticists, empirical and formal. The right approach to the a priori is not through transcendental idealism, nor through semantic anti-realism, but through taking seriously the idea that aprioricity is normativity. So I and others have argued (in my case, in *The Domain of Reason*, Osford University Press, 2010).

The Critical approach is not dead! Reverting, however, to the historical view, I have to say that it is certainly a minority standpoint in current "analytic" philosophy. The distinctive combination of naturalism and metaphysical realism – which the Critical outlook dismisses as dogmatism, "transcendental realism", etc. – *is* the default Anglo-Saxon view. If we see things in this way then it is actually the analytic tradition's temporary dominance in the Anglo-Saxon philosophical world that looks like the exception.

Brian Weatherson
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

1) There are a lot of strong cultural similarities. Both traditions are extremely Anglophone, late analytic even more so given the importance of philosophy in German to early analytic philosophy. Both are very white and very male. Both take roughly the same set of historical figures to be central to the canon, though this matters not a great deal because so many in both traditions downplay the importance of history of philosophy. Both see philosophy as continuous more with the sciences than the humanities. Both are rather fond of theories that can be expressed in formal languages, especially if the formalism is not especially challenging.

But, from my perspective at least, the differences are more striking. I'll focus on the areas I know best – those around language and epistemology. The story in moral and political is I suspect different, but I don't know it well enough to comment.

Philosophy of science is a huge part of early analytic philosophy; to some practitioners it is central to all philosophy. This is not true for late analytic philosophy. Philosophy of science has splintered into philosophy of the different sciences; there is little written at the level of generality that was common in early analytic philosophy of science. I think this has been a great thing philosophically, since we learn more from detailed study. But none of the resulting sub-disciplines are as central as philosophy of science once was.

Early analytic philosophy was much more concerned with ideal languages and ideal minds. It didn't matter (to many people) whether Russell's theory of definite descriptions was an adequate account of certain English noun phrases, just as long as it could work as an account of descriptions in an ideal language. Late analytic philosophy is much more concerned with actual languages and actual minds. This was no doubt helped along by arguments (due to, among others, Turing, Grice, Montague and Fodor) that we could investigate actual minds and languages without giving up our beloved formal tools.

The most important change has been a movement towards metaphysical realism, and towards anti-scepticism, and away from transcendental arguments. (I'll call this package realism in what follows.) These are related; if scepticism is false and moreover knowledge is easy, then we can't do metaphysics by asking what things must be like for knowledge to be possible. That won't constrain the possibilities sufficiently.

The trend towards realism is by no means universal. There are plenty of anti-realists, and sceptics, around. But one can nowadays simply presuppose a much stronger kind of realism than could be presupposed in early analytic phi-

losophy. (Or, for that matter, in English language modern philosophy.) And it is a trend that is continuing. David Lewis was more realist than the prevailing trends when he wrote *Counterfactuals* and "New Work", but less realist than the prevailing trends when he wrote "Ramseyan Humility". And this wasn't because Lewis's worldview had changed, but because the discipline had become more realist-leaning.

2) The cultural and ideological features are easiest to identify. The people who make up late analytic philosophy are, in general, white, Anglophone, male, relatively wealthy, fairly urban, and politically left-wing. This has had a dramatic effect on the questions that mainstream late analytic philosophy takes seriously, and I suspect a large effect on the answers it has taken seriously too. There are signs that these cultural features are changing. The mainstream includes more philosophers from non-Anglophone countries than it did a few decades back, though most of the exchanges are still in English. PhD programs in philosophy are less white, and less male, than the discipline as a whole. And, at least anecdotally, it seems that this is making a difference in what questions and answers are taken seriously. But there is a long way to go on these fronts.

I've already mentioned one big philosophical feature of the mainstream: a widespread acceptance of realism. This has consequences across the discipline. It means that error theories have a hard time gaining widespread acceptance. Such theories exist, and have prominent defenders, but they rarely become orthodoxy. On the other hand, there has been an upsurge in interest in projects like naturalized epistemology. Philosophers have become more interested in starting with practices as we find them, and critiquing those practices by our own standards, not a possibly mythical external standard. As Elizabeth Anderson and Louise Antony (among others) have noted, feminist epistemology has long had such a naturalist approach, and a big part of the story of the last few decades is the mainstream becoming more appreciative of feminist insights (though unfortunately not always under that description).

Another striking feature of the mainstream is its use of vignettes and thought experiments. From Philippa Foot's runaway trolleys, to Peter Singer's drowning child, to Judith Jarvis Thomson's dying violinist, to Frank Jackson's imprisoned scientist, to David Chalmers's zombies, late analytic philosophy has been full of stories and characters. It is controversial how much and what kind of argumentative work these stories and characters are doing in late analytic philosophy. But there is a strong norm that, no matter how abstract one's subject matter, one ought to include such stories in one's philosophical work. I think this is continuous with the previous point; one point of these stories is to show how the theoretical issues being debated are grounded in our current

views and practices. And this in turn leads to a familiar critique; the stories can't play their intended role if they are so fantastic.

3) This focus on stories is clearly controversial; indeed, it is a thriving controversy. I think Tamar Szabó Gendler's work on thought experiments did a lot to make philosophers appreciate the philosophical issues at stake here. There are at least two big questions: What role do these stories play, and are they fit to play that role? And a common critique is that they play an evidential role – intuitions about cases are givens in inquiry – that they aren't fit to play. They aren't fit because intuitions are too variable, and too unreliable, especially when the stories are so removed from everyday life. For what it's worth, I'm sympathetic both to Herman Cappelen's argument that these stories are used more frequently to illustrate and clarify than to argue, and to Timothy Williamson's argument that it's perfectly reasonable to use what we know about these stories in philosophical reasoning. But it's hard to talk about controversies and not talk about this issue.

The move to realism has gone along with a move to more applied questions. In epistemology, for example, there are fewer papers nowadays on the nature and possibility of knowledge, and more on perception, on testimony, and on moral epistemology. The same pattern recurs in a bunch of different sub-disciplines. (I noted above a similar trend in philosophy of science.) I think this has been a very welcome change. But it has had some difficult side-effects.

One is that there has been a sequence of fads sweeping the field. From nonconceptual content to fictionalism to zombies to Sleeping Beauty to vagueness to de se content to contextualism to grounding to peer disagreement we have seen a pattern where for a few years it seems everyone is talking about one hot problem and then for some reason (perhaps resolving the questions, perhaps boredom) we move on. I think most of these debates have been interesting, and I've enjoyed playing a part in several of them, but I suspect we'd be better off slowing the cycle down.

The more applied our research topics are, the more important it is to listen to researchers outside of philosophy. And the more important it is to listen to philosophers who listen to researchers outside of philosophy. It seems to me that we're doing better on the first of these – philosophy papers at least seem to include more citations of non-philosophers than was true some years back. It's not so clear that we're doing well on the second. It's common to see philosophers whose work draws heavily on research from elsewhere being told their work "isn't really philosophy", getting chilly receptions at talks and struggling to publish in generalist philosophy journals. In principle, most late analytic philosophers would sign on to a version of confirmation holism that

says evidence could come from all sorts of sources. Whether we all live up to that in practice is an ongoing question.

Timothy Williamson
University of Oxford

1) Early analytic philosophy was not a homogeneous movement, even when pursued by just a handful of people. Frege, Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein, and Carnap had very different philosophical styles from each other, very different ideas of what they were doing. Late analytic philosophy is even more diverse. It's active in most countries in the world, dominant in many, and still growing. It covers most branches of philosophy. The terminology suggests that the early version had a more revolutionary or pioneering feel to it than later, which is probably true, though classification in hindsight can be misleading – it is easy to forget how much the early analytic philosophers were in dialogue with immediate predecessors and contemporaries now assigned to different periods or traditions.

The phrase "late analytic philosophy", like "late capitalism", hints at wishful thinking of imminent collapse, though I understand that the editors intended it more neutrally. Perhaps one day the present will be classified as still belonging to an early stage of analytic philosophy. More likely, though, it will not be marked off as so different from a long development through figures such as Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, and Hume – prototypical philosophers whose ambitious theorizing nevertheless engages with, or helps create, other sciences. A recent example is the way in which intensional semantics, developed by philosophers such as Carnap, Richard Montague, David Kaplan, and David Lewis has led to formal semantics as a branch of linguistics.

In some ways, late analytic philosophy has more in common with early analytic philosophy than with the intervening period of "middle" analytic philosophy. The "Linguistic Turn", whatever its exact nature, belonged mainly to that middle period – Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle, ordinary language philosophy. Frege, Russell, and Moore were not linguistic philosophers in any distinctive sense. Nor are most contemporary analytic philosophers. Non-linguistic analytic philosophers can still be seriously concerned with language in various ways, as were Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. One wants to understand the semantics of natural languages for its own sake, or in order to use the instrument of most of our philosophizing more accurately. One may devise artificial formal languages as better instruments for systematic theorizing and arguing. Those activities don't make one a linguistic philosopher, because they

imply no special relationship of philosophy to language. Linguists, historians, literary theorists, psychologists, and sociologists all study natural languages too. Computer scientists study artificial languages. The Linguistic Turn was supposed to be more than that. Late analytic philosophy has woken up to the failure of linguistic philosophy to deliver on its methodological promises, its failure even to study language systematically enough. Nevertheless, contemporary philosophy of language comes from a synthesis of the best of two rival traditions in middle analytic philosophy.

2) It's tricky to identify a mainstream in late analytic philosophy because philosophy, almost as much as most other disciplines, has become so specialized. Epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, moral philosophy, and so on are pursued as separate branches of inquiry, though with some interesting interactions between them. Philosophy of language has no privileged position; it isn't the driving force for the rest of philosophy as it perhaps was in the mid-twentieth century. Nevertheless, at a higher level of abstraction, there are common features – not universal, of course, but at least typical. As already mentioned, late analytic philosophy is not linguistic philosophy. Nor, despite its name, does it tend to regard itself as doing linguistic or conceptual analysis in any distinctive sense. For instance, if you ask contemporary analytic metaphysicians whether they are interested in temporal words or concepts, they will tend to say, no, what really interests them is the nature of time itself. This often goes with a more or less realist attitude to the subject matter of philosophy.

A related feature of contemporary analytic philosophy is that it generally takes as obvious that the findings of the natural and social sciences can be philosophically significant. For instance, it would sound extremely old-fashioned for a philosopher of perception to say "I don't need to know what experimental psychologists of perception have discovered, because their questions are empirical; mine are conceptual". Attitudes now are very different from Wittgenstein's or Ryle's. There is also much less resistance than there was to the use of formal methods in philosophy, where relevant – another similarity with early analytic philosophy.

A welcome trend is the increase in applied philosophy. Applied ethics is an obvious example, but now analytic philosophy of language and analytic metaphysics are being applied to political philosophy, the philosophy of gender and race, and so on. There are lots of new questions to ask. Late analytic philosophy is not at all "purist" about what counts as philosophy.

Of course, change in philosophy is never uniform. You can still find young philosophers who look on contemporary analytic philosophy as a sad decline

from the golden age of Wittgenstein or Austin. The point is that they feel alienated from contemporary analytic philosophy in a way that, for example, most other young analytic philosophers don't.

Culturally, late analytic philosophy is slightly ill at ease in the humanities (especially those most influenced by post-modernism), because its methodology is more scientific in spirit, though of course one finds scientific attitudes in linguistics, scholarly history and so on. Geographically, the biggest change is that the mainstream is less concentrated in English-speaking countries. For example, there are world centres of formal philosophy in Amsterdam and Munich.

3) Most critics of analytic philosophy are deeply ignorant of it. Their criticisms tend to be obsolete when made, based on a stereotype of it as logical positivism. Admittedly, one does find logical positivists, some "hard", some "soft", amongst contemporary analytic philosophers, who criticize analytic metaphysics on the basis of what I regard as the most sterile aspects of Carnap's work. Incidentally, Carnap is an example of analytic philosophy's capacity to undersell itself. He was highly creative, but felt compelled by the scientific spirit to write in the most boring, monotonous style possible.

Some late analytic philosophers take deference to natural science too far, making philosophy little more than pop science. Extreme naturalists read their metaphysics off fundamental physics (or their dream of it), without recognizing how much their reductionism depends on philosophical dogma rather than the physics itself. Philosophy has its own distinctive, valuable skill-set, just as mathematics, biology, and history have. We offer most to other disciplines when we don't try to ape them.

Recently, many practitioners of analytic philosophy have been criticizing it for being insufficiently diverse – too many white males. Of course, many other disciplines face similar issues, especially the natural sciences. Philosophers like to present their discipline as more exceptional than it really is, in bad ways as well as good. Historically, language has been a major problem too: once Nazism drove most analytic philosophy out of German-speaking universities, being a native English speaker was a huge unfair advantage in analytic philosophy. Fortunately, things are changing, though more quickly in some respects than others. Predictably, some people try to exploit this movement to advance their own extraneous agenda. For instance, they suggest that there should be less emphasis on formal methods and rigorous criticism in order to make philosophy more welcoming to women. That attitude patronizes women, and isn't based on evidence. Philosophers like Ruth Barcan Marcus, Elizabeth Anscombe, Judith Jarvis Thomson, and Delia Graff Fara are at least as tough-minded as their male colleagues. A good model is semantics as a branch of lin-

guistics. Many of the most important semanticists are women – Barbara Hall Partee, Irene Heim, Angelika Kratzer – and have been leaders in introducing and applying rigorous formal methods like those of analytic philosophy. Women don't need a dumbed-down, "gentler" sort of philosophy. Similarly, it's insulting to suggest that non-whites only need some sort of philosophy-lite, 10% philosophy and 90% political polemic. It is turning out that many premodern Indian and Tibetan philosophers used methods reminiscent of analytic philosophy. Their texts can be studied and engaged with philosophically just like those of the ancient Greeks, as can those of great Islamic philosophers such as Averroes and Avicenna.

Jonathan Wolff
University of Oxford

[Prof. Wolff answered a single unified question concerning late analytic philosophy and political philosophy]. I am going to respond with reference primarily to political philosophy, and to the piece I wrote for the *Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy*, on "Analytic Political Philosophy". I had not thought hard about the connections between analytic philosophy and political philosophy until I was asked by Mike Beaney to write that paper. Of course one way of writing such a paper would be simply to describe the developments in political philosophy during the heyday of analytical philosophy, but I was more interested to see whether the claimed innovations of analytical philosophy had influenced that development.

My general conclusion was that it is not especially helpful to use the general category of "analytic philosophy" to describe developments in political philosophy in the twentieth century. Hence, it is not likely that a division into "early" and "late" will be much help either. My general feeling is that political philosophy, as it has emerged in the post-Rawls era, is, at least in the English-speaking world, a continuation of political philosophy as conducted by Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Kant, Bentham and Mill. This is broadly an Enlightenment project, confident in the power of abstract reasoning to defend progress, individual liberty, and some forms of equality, although it comes under pressure from the critical romanticism of Rousseau, which also leads to Marx, Hegel and British Hegelianism. In brief, my view is that, at least in the UK, at the end of the nineteenth century a form of Hegelianism had become dominant, and the rise of analytic philosophy, though presenting itself as something new, was a return to the older traditions. Rather than a radical new view, analytic political philosophy is continuous with pre-Hegelian political philosophy.

To explain in a bit more detail, in my judgement the three main features of early analytic philosophy were the emphasis on precision in definition, the use of new formal methods of argumentation, and the rejection of the doctrine of internal relations. This is the denial of the metaphysical thesis that distinct objects can stand in logically necessary relations to each other. It is a way of rejecting the forms of idealism and holism that had been promoted by British Hegelianism. Russell, and later, Ayer, clearly rejected these forms of thought, which could be associated with highly illiberal political regimes in which the individual could legitimately be sacrificed to the whole, understood as the state. Later on, and rather oddly, one site in which the struggle between holism and analytical political philosophy was played out, in my view, was in Isaiah Berlin's paper "Two Concepts of Liberty", in which the ideas of positive freedom of the British Hegelians were rejected in favour of a much more individualist account of negative liberty.

It is, therefore, possible to identify a movement in twentieth century English-speaking political philosophy as taking up one of the general themes of analytical philosophy, although it was a reaction against the previous few decades, rather than the broader history of the subject. But I mentioned three themes of analytic philosophy, of which the rejection of internal relations was only one. The other two, however, are much more problematic. Formal methods were not really used very much in political philosophy until R.B. Braithwaite's 1954 inagural lecture "The Theory of Games as A Tool for the Moral Philosopher". This, it has been said, was a result of appointing a philosopher of science to the Knightbridge Chair, then a chair in moral philosophy; an interesting experiment that could perhaps be tried more often. As I understand this lecture was Braithwaite's sole attempt to contribute to moral philosophy.

The introduction of game and decision theory went hand in hand with the revival of social contract theory, through the work of Rawls, and more notably, Gauthier. But Gauthier is interesting in this respect, in that he also initiated a tradition, followed later in a more detailed way by both Gregory Kavka and Jean Hampton, of interpreting Hobbes by use of game theory. That contemporary tools can shed considerable light on earlier texts helps demonstrate the continuity of modern and contemporary political philosophy. Amartya Sen and Jon Elster have also insightfully used formal methods to illuminate failures of rationality and problems of collective action, but my sense is that it is their conceptual insights rather than formal methods that have proven to be of lasting value.

The other main area that comes to mind where formal methods have been widely used is in relation to democratic theory, but there the first move was made by Condorcet with the introduction of the Jury Theorem in 1785, and

much work in democratic theory builds upon this result. Again we see connections much more than new beginnings.

The final element was an insistence on precise definitions. Of course given the pompous and meaningless prose of the worst of the British Hegelians, and other metaphysical philosophers of the early twentieth century, impatience is understandable. But at the same time it is the same complaint that Hobbes, in *De cive*, made of his predecessors. Therefore it is hard to see the insistence on definition as something altogether new. And my own view is that it is probably a mistake. I side with Aristotle, who argued against assuming that all areas of thought can be subjected to the same disciplines of precision, and also with Nietzsche, who claimed that no concept that has a history has a (single) definition. Hence I think too much energy has been diverted to the fruitless task of undertaking conceptual analysis and hoping for a single, compelling, answer in opposition to alternative accounts. I would not deny that conceptual analysis is important and needed, but in political philosophy at least it should be one stage in a project that should lead to substantive results, rather than an end in itself. Hence I would say that its encounter with analytic methodologies has brought mixed results for political philosophy.